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Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: 
General Provisions; Sales, Bulk Transfers, and 
Documents of Title 
By David Frisch,* Fairfax Leary, fr.,** and john D. Wladis*** 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 
A drafting compromise by the U.C.C. drafters in section 1-105 dictated the 
state having an "appropriate relation" to govern choice of law problems in the 
absence of a contractual clause, and if there is a clause, a "reasonable relation" 
to the state selected. The purpose was to leave choice of law problems to the 
general rules of the common law.1 Thus, some courts in breach of warranty 
cases continue to apply the tests of "place of injury" for personal injury suits 
and "place of contracting" for what does not involve personal injury,2 while 
others look for the state having the most "significant contacts" with the transac-
tion.3 
When there is a choice of law clause, two approaches continue to be used: 
"reasonable relation" and "appropriate relation." Reasonable relation is held to 
require less contact by the state selected by the parties than appropriate relation. 
It is questionable, however, whether the selection merely serves to effect an 
0 Mr. Frisch is a member of the Rhode Island bar and Associate Professor of Law at The Delaware 
Law School of Widener University . 
.. Mr. Leary is a member of the Pennsylvania, New York, and District of Columbia bars and 
Distinguished Senior Professor of Law at the Delaware Law School of Widener University . 
... Mr. Wladis is a member of the New York bar and Associate Professor of Law at the Delaware 
Law School at Widener University. 
1. Professor Leary was present at some of the discussions among the drafters and makes the 
statement from memory. 
2. Morgan v. Mar-Bel, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 438, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1271 (N.D. 
Ga. 1985) (injury in Georgia, place of contracting Florida, plaintiff loses under Georgia's privity 
requirement). 
3. See, e.g., Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. Zotal Ltd., 394 Mass. 95, 474 N.E.2d 1070, 40 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 487 (1985) (law of Massachusetts having more significant contacts 
applied to prevent Massachusetts buyer's setoff of damage claim in action for price rather than the 
allegedly contra rule of Israel, in which seller was located. Goods were sold "F.O.B. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts." Court ruled that established conflicts principles establish, for U.C.C. purposes, the 
appropriateness of the relation of a jurisdiction's laws). 
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allocation of a risk that under governing law could have been allocated by a 
term in the contract specifically allocating the risk. 4 
With this background, counsel seeking to protect the client from any unfortu-
nate results of a choice of law clause, endeavor to show, often unsuccessfully, 
that the result is contrary to strong policy of the forum state. 5 
In Burroughs Corp. v. Suntogs of Miami, Inc.,6 the parties selected Michigan 
law and agreed to a two-year limitation period. A Florida statute, amended 
after Florida's adoption of the U.C.C., provided that a contractual provision 
shortening the period provided in the applicable statute of limitations was 
"void."7 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court ruling that 
Florida public policy voided the clause. The court based its decision upon the 
policy found in U.C.C. section 1-105, an analogy to Florida's usury law,8 that 
the statute before it was "riddled with exceptions,"9 and concluded "third, we do 
not consider the protections offered by a statute of limitations fundamental to a 
legal system."10 
4. Intamin, Inc. v. Figley-Wright Contractors, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 1350, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 766 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (contract for construction of a roller-coaster, which under Illinois' 
"dominant aspect" test would be a service contract. The contract provided for construction and 
enforcement "in accordance with the law of the State of Illinois and the Uniform Commercial Code 
of that State" except as expressly contradicted by a term of the contract). 
5. Mostek Corp. v. Chemetron Corp., 642 S.W.2d 20, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 840 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (goods delivered in Texas. Illinois law applied as parties had not contracted 
"at will, fraudulently or capriciously" to avoid law of Texas. Warranty disclaimers and disclaimers 
of negligence not contrary to Texas law. Illinois precluded disclaimers of strict liability in tort); 
Kathenes v. Quick Chek Food Stores, 596 F. Supp. 713, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1326 
(D.N.J. 1984) (personal injury claim of consumer having been settled, the indemnity action between 
bottler and supplier was governed by contractual choice of Ohio law, and no strong public policy of 
New Jersey required application of New Jersey's product liability law to the commercial transac-
tion between merchants. Contractual limitation of liability term in confirming invoice, under 
U.C.C. § 2-207, became a part of contract as a nonmaterial additional term); Bancorp Leasing & 
Fin. Corp. v. Burhoop, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1426 (9th Cir. 1984; unpublished and not 
citable in 9th Circuit) (parties to secured transaction selection of Colorado's rebuttable presumption 
of value in nonconforming sale of collateral not contrary to California's public policy because 
California's rule is absolute bar of deficiency. Here presumption was rebutted). 
6. 472 So. 2d 1166, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 498 (Fla. 198t. 
7. Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 95.03 (West 1975) reads, "Any provision in a co tract fixing the period of 
time within which an action arising out of a contract may be begun at a ti e less than that provided 
by the applicable statute of limitations is void." 
8. Citing Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 395, So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1981) 
(choice of law clause permits recovery of interest at ~ rate higher than the Florida cap but 
permissible in the other state). Usury law of Florida was "fraught with exceptions." 
9. 472 So. 2d at 1168, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 501. 
10. Id. The other two stated grounds were that the statute had not been applied to maritime 
cases under "an earlier, even more stringent version" (citing Arrow Beffe Corp. v. South Atl. & 
Caribbean Lines, Inc., 280 So. 2d 43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) and two earlier district court of 
appeals cases). The earlier version expressly declared shortening clauses "contrary to the public 
policy of the state." Id. at 1168 note, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 501 note. Also cited were 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Enright, 258 So. 2d 472 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) and one other 
case, in which the only connection with Florida was that plaintiff resided in Florida when suit was 
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An attempt, effective in lower court, to avoid a choice of law provision on the 
ground that it had not been brought to the attention of the buyer was reversed 
by the Fifth Circuit as "clearly erroneous" on the evidence, as the paper was 
"transparent" showing clearly that there were terms on the reverse. 11 
HYBRID SALES AND SERVICE CASES 
The year was uneventful for the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Scope of the Code. 
There were actually only three interesting cases on what constitutes a transac-
tion in goods. 
The dreary litany of repair, construction, and purchase of business contracts 
not being subject to the U.C.C. continued,12 as did the "true lease" versus the 
started. The court noted that such contractual provisions had been upheld in 1918 and that a statute 
of limitations was "merely ... an affirmative defense" and did not invalidate the contract. 
11. Lafayette Stabilizer Repair, Inc. v. Machinery Wholesalers Corp. 750 F.2d 1290, 40 
U.C.C .. Rep. Serv. 122 (5th Cir. 1985) (in addition to the transparency of the paper, the signer was 
"a lawyer with approximately twenty-seven years of experience" and thus could be reasonably 
expected to examine the back of the paper. The result reached by the trial court was a judgment for 
the return of the purchase price "and certain associated expenses such as interest paid on the loan to 
finance the purchase price and the cost of repairs" for a total judgment of $86,436.55. Defendant's 
claim that a term limiting its liability for the cost of repairs to $6,900 was a U.C.C. § 2-718 
liquidated damage clause was dismissed as well as its claims of lack of prompt notice of breach of 
warranty and lack of proper inspection). 
12. In general, U.C.C. not applicable: Gee v. Chattahoochee Tractor Sales, Inc., 172 Ga. App. 
351, 323 S.E.2d 176, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 30 (1984) (installation of engine block); 
Clancy v. Oak Park Village Athletic Center, 364 N.W.2d 312, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
832 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (puddle on racquetball court, slipped and fell); DeValerio v. Vic Tanny 
Int'l, 363 N.W.2d 447, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 836 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (use of 
equipment at a spa). U.C.C. applicable: Yorke v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 130 Ill. App. 3d 220, 474 
N.E.2d 20 (1985) (vinyl pellets and technical assistance, goods aspect predominates); but cf 
Acchione & Canuso v. Reed Mining Tools, Inc., 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1585 (E.D. Pa. 
1984) (change of function of machine but sale of goods because contract was for parts with free 
design services. Court said if contract had been to change the soft tunnel boring machine into a rock 
cutter, contract would have been for services). The last case seems to overemphasize form. Sale of 
business as an entity-U.C.C. not applicable: Beauliau of Am. Inc. v. Coronet Indus., Inc., 327 
S.E.2d 508, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 20 (Ga. App. 1985) (sale of industrial plant, general 
statute of frauds applicable); D.G. Porter, Inc. v. Fridley, 373 N.W.2d 917, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 1823 (N.D. 1985) (sale of bar and grill, goodwill, liquor license, assignment of lease, 
etc. predominate); accord Flo-Mor, Inc. v. Birmingham, 176 Ga. App. 375, 336 S.E.2d 264, 42 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 228 (1985); Dravo Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 602 F.2d 1136, 
40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 362 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (main assets were drawings and tracings 
and five-year noncompetition agreement). Not every asset in a sale of a business needs to be goods; 
rather, goods must predominate. De Filippo v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 1313 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 912 (1975). Construction contracts: Wellmore Coal Co. v. Powell Constr. Co., 600 
F. Supp 1042, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 362 (W.D. Va. 1984) (coal preparation plant; 
because both parties treated transactions as a sale, U.C.C. warranties applied); Smith v. Urethane 
Installations, Inc., 492 A.2d 1266, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 733 (Me. 1985) (in contract to 
insulate a home, U.C.C. statute of limitations not applicable); Union Exploration Co. v. Dowell 
Div. Dow Chem. Co., 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 759 (D. Kan. 1985) (primary cement 
work on oil wells; U.C.C. principles regarding exculpatory provisions applied); Peerless Pump v. 
Blythe-Vanguard Constr. Corp., 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (a 
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disguised sale distinction in the application of a variety of sections of the 
U.C.C. 13 A distinction was also made between the true finance lease and other 
leases,14 anticipating the distinction to be made upon the adoption, anywhere, of 
the Uniform Personal Property Leasing Act approved by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 15 There were also cases arguing 
whether the U.C.C. applied to distributorship agreements. 16 
manufacture of effiuent pumps to buyer's specifications was still a sale of goods, not a service 
contract. Statute of limitations not tolled). Miscellaneous: Weiss v. Karch, 466 N.E.2d 155, 477 
N.Y.S.2d 615, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 901 (1984) (damage rules of article 2 apply to sale 
of securities transferring cooperative apartment); Pierce v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 166 Cal. App. 3d 
85, 212 Cal Rptr. 283, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 20 (1985) (electricity in stream of 
commerce a "product" for strict liability issue; dismissal reversed. Warranty issue not in pleadings 
nor in discovery. Hence, dismissal of warranty count affirmed); Piney Woods Country Life School 
v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1220 (5th Cir. 1984) (natural gas; U.C.C. 
used to determine time of sale for royalty purposes); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co., 
754 F.2d 303, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 370 (10th Cir. 1985) (natural gas; U.C.C. 
applies). 
13. As to applicability of the U.C.C. in some lease transactions, see Beneficial Commercial Corp. 
v. Cottrell, 688 P.2d 1254, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1308 (Mont. 1984) (warranty 
disclaimers and unconscionability in a lease with nominal option to purchase); Irving Leasing Corp. 
v. M & H Tire Co., 16 Ohio App. 3d 191, 475 N .E.2d 127, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 381 
(1984) (applying U.C.C. § 2-302); Hannaford Bros. Co. v. State Tax Assessor, 487 A.2d 251, 40 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 374 (Me. 1985) (lease constituted a sale for use tax purposes); 
Baldwin v. National Safe Depository Corp., 697 P.2d 587, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 471 
(1985) (U.C.C. applied to "operating lease"); Baker v. Promark Prods. W., Inc., 692 S.W.2d 844, 
41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 725 (Tenn. 1985) (breach of warranty); Henderson v. Benson-
Hartman Motors, Inc., 33 Pa. D. & C. 3d 6, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 782 (Pa. Ct. 
Common Pleas 1983) (warranty beneficiaries under U.C.C. in lease transaction); Chemical Bank v. 
Rinden Professional Ass'n, 498 A.2d 706, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1035 (N.H. 1985) 
(lease-purchase agreement applying U.C.C. art. 2 as to modifications and effect of assignment to 
bank). 
14. Baldwin v. National Safe Depository Corp., 697 P.2d at 589 n.2, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) at 473 n.2. Cf Bancohio Nat'! Bank v. Freeland, 13 Ohio App. 3d 245, 468 N.E.2d 
941, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 748 (1984) (15-year statute of limitations governs lender's 
sale of collateral and claim for deficiency, not U .C.C. § 2-706(3) as to notice and § 2-725 as to 
limitations. What if bank had been assignee of sales contract with a seller's reservation of title? 
15. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the Uniform 
Personal Property Leasing Act at its summer 1985 meeting using occasionally modified U.C.C. art. 
2 sections. At this writing, it has not been adopted by any state. In Dec. 1985, the U.C.C. 
Permanent Editorial Board recommended the addition of the Act, with minor changes, to the 
U.C.C. as a new art. 2A. Therefore, under future consideration is whether the Act should be 
formally integrated into the U.C.C. by action of the ALI and the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at appropriate meetings of those bodies. 
16. See Lorenz Supply Co. v. American Standard Inc., 419 Mich. 610, 358 N.W.2d 845, 39 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1169 (1984) (distributorship agreement not mentioning exclusive dealing or 
supplying requirements not a transaction in goods for U.C.C. § 2-201 purposes). But see Seaman's 
Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil of Cal., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 686 P.2d 
1158 ( 1984) (implying that a "dealership arrangement" clearly implied an arrangement to supply 
the dealer's requirements, thus satisfying the general statute of frauds as to contracts not to be 
performed within a year as well as the U.C.C.'s provision). See also Rustproofing Center, Inc. v. 
Gulf Oil Corp., 755 F.2d 1231, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 802 (6th Cir. 1985) (open price 
to be fixed by Gulf, not a failure to act in good faith if price is higher than retail prices charged by 
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RRX Industries, Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc. 11 raised again for the Ninth Circuit 
the question of the classification of computer software. Admittedly the decision 
should be case by case,18 but, just as an architect's or engineer's contract is for 
services and not for a sale of the completed drawings,19 so too a computer 
software contract, when a proper analysis of the design features of a program is 
really the predominant factor, should be a contract for services.20 On the other 
hand, prepackaged software programs, like cassettes and phonograph records, 
should be classified as "goods,"21 although a contract for a musician to play a 
musical number to be taped for just one listener would not be. 
Categorizing computer software as "goods" may be influenced by the paucity 
of precedent if a service categorization, emphasizing the brain-work require-
ment for custom-designed software, were to have been adopted. Perhaps the 
matter will be clarified by the new Scope Subcommittee, along with the 
problems arising in many recognizable service contracts.22 
dealer's competitors); Conoco Inc. v. Inman Oil Co., 774 F.2d 895, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 1602 (8th Cir. 1985) (violation of good faith under U.C.C. § 1-203 for supplier to bid 
against the distributor for supply contract with jobber's oldest and best customer); Loos & Dilworth 
v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 46 (Pa. Super. 1985) (U.C.C. 
principles applied by analogy; termination of franchise agreement must be with honesty in fact 
(U.C.C. § 1-201(19)), and franchisor must have acted in a commercially reasonable manner. Hence 
franchisee offering no evidence of what is commercially reasonable can still recover upon proof of a 
lack of honesty in fact. New trial ordered by trial judge affirmed, charge should have used an "or" 
instead of an "and" between "good faith" and "acting in a commercially reasonable manner"). 
17. 772 F.2d 543, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1561 (9th Cir. 1985). 
18. The court stated that "the sales aspect of the transaction predominates," and that "employee 
training, repair services, and upgrading were incidental." 772 F.2d at 546, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 
1564. For the need for case-by-case analysis, the court cited Note, Computer Programs as Goods 
under the U.C.C., 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1149 (1979). The court does not discuss the service aspect of 
designing the software. 
19. Software not packaged for repeated sales to many different computer users seems more 
analogous to design drawings that are not considered goods. See Department of Transp. v. 
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 28 Pa. Commw. 439, 368 A.2d 888, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 36 
(1977) (bridge design plans not goods). Dravo Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 602 F. Supp. 1136, 
40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 362 (W.D. Pa. 1985), in which the court said of a sale of 
engineering drawings, "The significance of these items in this transaction is not their physical 
properties, but the ideas contained therein." 602 F. Supp. at 1140, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 369. 
The significance of specially designed software is not its physical properties but the commands it 
enables the operator to give to the hardware. 
20. While a contract to publish books for general sale may be a contract for goods, a contract to 
write a book and deliver one copy or all copies to one person would be a contract for services. In 
Printing Center of Texas, Inc. v. Supermind Publishing Co., 669 S.W.2d 779, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 127-30 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) the court said that to treat a contract to print and deliver 
5,000 books as a transaction in goods was a "doubtful assumption," but the issue was not properly 
raised. 
21. Thus, prepackaged programs to be inserted in any number of personal computers should be 
classified as "goods," just as are cassettes for producing music on any given number of players or 
phonograph records. 
22. One member of this Subcommittee has long complained of the difficulty of finding precedent 
applicable to commercial service contracts. The new Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Scope, chaired by 
Professor Boss, met with this Subcommittee for the first time at the Section's 1985 spring meeting. 
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Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Certainteed Corp.23 was the second interesting case. 
Safeway contracted for the building of a warehouse. The roofing contractor used 
products produced by Certainteed. The court treated the case as a sale of goods 
for warranty purposes, distinguishing it from an earlier construction of a 
building case24 in which it was ruled that the U.C.C. was not applicable. While 
Safeway was treated as having express warranty rights against Certainteed,25 
the statement that the roof was "bondable up to twenty years" did not make the 
warranty one extending to future performance (except in the view of a dissent-
ing judge).26 
Finally, a sale of the breeding rights to a stallion by a natural method was, in 
Kwik-Lok Corp. v. Pulse,21 ruled not a sale of goods when live breeding was 
contemplated, since the predominant subject of the contract was not readily 
removeable from the donor at the time of identification to the contract.28 
Other Statutes Affecting Articles 2 and 7 
Other statutes are beginning to affect sales law under the U.C.C. The 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act29-
23. 687 S.W.2d 22, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 46 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). 
24. Id. at 24 n.1, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 47 n.1. Vaughn Bldg. Corp. v. Austin Co., 620 
S.W.2d 678 (Tex Ct. App. 1981), affd 643 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. 1983). Accord Mennonite Deaconess 
Home & Hosp. v. Gates Eng'g Co., 363 N.W.2d 155, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 396 (Neb. 
1985) (a one-ply, System I roof manufactured and designed by defendant and installed by others 
under defendant's supervision). In both the claim was for breach of warranty. Contra Elizabeth 
Gamble Deaconess Home Ass'n v. Turner Constr. Co., 14 Ohio App. 3d 281, 470 N.E.2d 950, 39 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1198 (1984) (U.C.C. does not apply to materials incorporated into a 
structure). Apparently alternative A of U.C.C. § 2-318 precluded suit as a third-party beneficiary of 
the installer's contract with the supplier. But see infra text accompanying note 94. 
25. This was based on Certainteed's advertising and description of its product as "bondable up 
to twenty years," which had been examined by the plantiff before making the contract. Suit was 
instituted nine years after installation and was ruled to be barred by U.C.C. § 2-725. 687 S.W.2d at 
24, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 46, 47. 
26. The majority felt that the language quoted was only a warranty or representation that a 
bond could be purchased and Safeway had introduced no evidence on the point. Id. at 25, 41 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 48. Judge Guillot, dissenting, felt that the language meant that a bond 
could be purchased at any time for a minimum of one year and up to a maximum of 20 years after 
completion depending on when the bond was purchased. Hence the warranty "explicitly" extended 
to future performance. Id. at 27, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 50. Extending the warranty, 
however, would eliminate the need to pay any premium for the roofing bond. 
27. 41 Wash. App. 142, 702 P.2d 1226 (1985). 
28. Id. at ___ , 702 P.2d at 1228 n.1. Where the sperm is packaged and sold for artificial 
insemination. Another aspect of breeding rights, the saleable right of each of 36 syndicate members 
to nominate a mare to breed each season, was involved in Trimble v. North Ridge Farms, Inc., 41 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1458 (Ky. 1985). The issue was whether the secured party after 
default could exercise the nominating right for the 1982 season that had been sold as permitted by 
the syndicate agreement assigned as collateral. The trial court had ruled in favor of the assignee of 
the secured party who then exercised the rights. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court of 
Kentucky, which affirmed a reversal of the trial court by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, the case 
could only be left open for a determination of damages, an issue not ripe for the appellate court. 
29. 15 u.s.c. §§ 2301-2312 (1982). 
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figured in three cases. In a case involving a defective car with counts under the 
U.C.C. and under Magnuson-Moss, damages for emotional distress were de-
nied.30 In another case, a de(ller who had agreed in writing to perform warranty 
work for DeLorean cars, and had furnished a lessee with the manufacturer's 
warranty, had thereby issued a written warranty under Magnuson-Moss and 
could not disclaim the warranty of merchantability.31 Recovery of damages for 
loss of use of the car when the dealer refused to make repairs because DeLorean 
could not pay, and for costs of litigation and attorney's fees, was allowed. The 
third case reached a similar warranty result in a lease closely resembling an 
installment sale.32 
A North Carolina statute relating to suits for damages resulting from the use 
of fertilizer, which prescribed the evidence required, caused a dismissal of a 
grower's suit.33 
Federal and state "seed laws" have been held not to preempt the warranty 
and unconscionability provisions of the U.C.C.34 
Colorado's livestock bill of sale laws did not affect the U.C.C.-mandated 
result in three cases.35 The results are similar to many interpretations of the 
effect of motor vehicle certificate of title laws.36 
In one case, a federal court, applying New York law, refused to dismiss a 
claim that a breach of warranty, as alleged, was a claim of deceptive practices 
30. Wise v. General Motors Corp., 588 F. Supp. 1207, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 900 
(W.D. Va. 1984). Hence, attorney's fees allowed under Magnuson-Moss to successful plaintiffs 
were not recoverable. 
31. Freeman v. Hubco Leasing, Inc., 253 Ga. 698, 324 S.E.2d 462, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 408 (1985). Because Hubco Leasing Inc. was an alter ego of the dealer plaintiff, it was 
allowed to revoke acceptance of the lease. 
32. Henderson v. Benson-Hartman Motors, Inc., 33 Pa. D. & C. 3d 6, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 782 (1983). 
33. L. Harvey and Son Co. v. Jarman, 76 N.C. App. 191, 333 S.E.2d 47, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 107 (1985). 
34. Hanson v. Funk Seeds Int'!, 373 N.W.2d 30, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1244 (S.D. 
1985); Martin v. Joseph Harris Co., Inc., 767 F.2d 296, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 315 
(6th Cir. 1985) (construing the Federal Seed Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1551-1611 (1982), Mich. Comp. 
Laws Ann.§§ 286.701-286.716 (West 1979) and S.D. Codified Laws Ann.§§ 3~-12-1to38-12-52 
(1969 and 1984 Supp.), which do not provide for a civil remedy). r 
35. Cugnini v. Reynolds Cattle Co., 687 P.2d 962, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (pallaghan) 112, 
(Colo. 1984) (compliance not necessary for passage of title); Moffat County State B4nk v. Prodµcers 
Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 598 F. Supp. 1562, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 314 (p. Colo. 1984), 
(description in art. 9 financing statement need not comply with livestock bill of sale law); Colorado 
State Bank of Walsh v. Hoffner, 701 P.2d 151, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1490 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1985) (failure of seller and reselling buyer to comply does not affect passage of title). 
36. See, e.g., Taylor & Martin, Inc. v. Hiland Dairy, Inc., 676 S.W.2d 859, 39 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 1672 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (failure to comply with Texas certificate of title to 
motor vehicle law does not preclude passage of title); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Lapp., 695 P.2d 1310, 40 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 887 (Mont. 1985). Inmi-Etti v. Aluisi, 492 A.2d 917, 40 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1612 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (erroneous issue of certificate of title 
confers no title). 
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under New York's "little FTC Act,"37 relying on Massachusetts and Washing-
ton cases.38 
A Virginia pre-U.C.C. law, not specifically repealed by the U.C.C., requir-
ing a particular type size in contracts, was ruled implicitly repealed by the 
requirement of U.C.C. section 2-316 that disclaimers be conspicuous.39 On the 
other hand, an Arkansas special statute regarding the sale or transfer of 
judgment liens prevailed over an l.R.S. lien despite the failure of the transferee 
to file under the u.c.c.•0 
A storer of grain in Arkansas taking an advance payment had not passed title 
to the warehouseman and so was still protected by the surety bond required of 
the warehouse by the Arkansas public grain warehouse law.41 
Perhaps our most interesting case in this area is Baker u. Promark Products 
West, lnc.,42 in which the Tennessee Supreme Court used its Product Liability 
Act's expanded definition of "seller"43 to permit recovery for breach of the 
implied warranty of merchantability against a lessor who had leased a stump 
grinder for half a day.•• The plaintiff was a user, not the lessee.45 The lower 
courts granted summary judgment to the lessor and the distributor. The high 
court reversed as to the lessor, using cases applying the U.C.C. warranties to 
leases without distinguishing those doing so on a finding of equivalence to sale. 
A division of authority was, however, recognized.46 The court affirmed the 
dismissal of the claim against the distributor for the reason that the distributor 
37. Associates Capital Servs. Corp. of N.J. v. Fairway Private Cars, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 10, 39 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 818 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
38. Id. (citing Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc., 8 Mass. App. 498, 396 N.E.2d 149 (1979); 
Linthicum v. Archambault, 379 Mass. 381, 398 N.E.2d 482 (1979); Haner v. Quincy Farm 
Chems., Inc., 29 Wash. App. 93, 98-103, 627 P.2d 571, 575-77 (1981)). Many of the little FTC 
Acts provide for the recovery of attorney fees, and some for treble damages. 
39. Armco Inc. v. New Horizon Dev. Co. of Va., Inc., 331 S.E.2d 456, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 367 (Va. 1985). 
40. Brown & Root, Inc. v. Hempstead County Sand & Gravel, Inc., 767 F.2d 464, 41 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1002 (8th Cir. 1985). 
41. Tucker v. Durham, 284 Ark. 264, 686 S.W.2d 402 (1985). 
42. 692 S.W.2d 844, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 725 (Tenn. 1985). 
43. The Tennessee Products Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-28-101 to -108 (1980), 
provided that "Seller" shall also include a lessor or bailor engaged in the business of leasing or 
bailment of a product. 
44. The plaintiff's claim in tort was dismissed under Tenn. Code Ann.§ 29-28-106(b) (1985 
Supp.), which prohibits suits on a strict liability in tort basis unless either the seller is the 
manufacturer or the manufacturer has been declared insolvent or is not subject to process. The 
manufacturer had been nonsuited and was not a party to the appeal. 
45. 692 S.W.2d at 845, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 727. Previously, Commercial Truck and 
Trailer Sales, Inc. v. McCampbell, 580 S.W.2d 765, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 340 (Tenn. 
1979) held that Tenn. Code Ann.§ 29-34-104, abolishing privily in all actions "for personal injury 
or property damage brought on account of negligence, strict liability or breach of warranty," had 
implicity amended Tennessee's U.C.C. § 2-318 to broaden the class of warranty beneficiaries. 
46. 692 S.W.2d at 848-49, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 731-32. The court cited cases from Alaska, 
Alabama, California Appeals, Florida law in a federal court, Georgia Appeals, Idaho, Illinois 
Appeals, and a lower court case in New York that had been reversed on other grounds by the 
Appellate Division. To the contra were cases from Delaware, Maryland, Montana, and Virginia, 
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merely transmitted orders for the equipment involved to the manufacturer, 
which shipped directly to the lessor.47 
It seems that other statutes must be considered more often than we think. 
ARTICLE 2-SALES 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Courts continue to struggle with the myriad forms of commercial arrange-
ments that defy easy categorization and seem not to have been contemplated 
when many provisions of article 2 were originally drafted. Consider, for 
example, distributorship agreements and the U.C.C.'s statute of frauds. If 
within the category "transactions in goods" they would be covered by article 2,48 
that alone is not enough to trigger U.C.C. section 2-201. They must addition-
ally be "contract(s] for the sale of goods."49 Finally, assuming that section 2-201 
does apply, how can its quantity requirement be satisfied when the future needs 
of the distributor will always be uncertain? 50 These problems arose in Lorenz 
Supply Co. v. American Standard, Inc. 51 
The trial court permitted the plaintiff, Lorenz, to prove, and the jury found 
that the parties had agreed that Lorenz was to become a distributor of American 
Standard products. The only writing that in any way evidenced this agreement 
was in a letter from American Standard to Lorenz that "welcome(d]" Lorenz 
"to the numbers of American Standard distributors across the country."52 
Affirming a judgment in favor of Lorenz, the Michigan Supreme Court, 
without deciding whether the agreement was within the general scope of article 
2, held it was not a contract for the sale of goods within the meaning of section 
2-201. The court's reasoning was simple and straightforward: it had to rule the 
way it did to preserve the enforceability of distributorship agreements it felt 
would be at risk if section 2-201 were to apply. A lengthy concurrence offers a 
different route to the same result. Justice Brickley had no difficulty finding that 
the agreement was subject to both article 2 and its statute of frauds, but would 
solve the quantity dilemma by inferring a quantity term, that is, the distribu-
tor's requirements. 53 
but at the time none of these contra jurisdictions had a products liability act in force. But see 
proposed Uniform Personal Property Leasing Act's treatment of warranties. 
47. The arguments used are similar to those used to rule that financing agencies are not subject 
to liability for breaches of warranty in the transactions financed. See, e.g., J.P. Marks Int'!, Inc. v. 
Corema S.A. Empresa De Comercio E. Exportacao, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 733 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
48. See V.C.C. § 2-102 ( 1978) ("unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to 
transactions in goods"). 
49. u.c.c. § 2-201 (1978). 
50. One absolute requirement of§ 2-201 is that the writing specify a quantity. See V.C.C. § 2-
201, Comment 1 (1978). 
51. 419 Mich. 610, 358 N.W.2d 845, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1169 (1984). 
52. Id. at 614, 358 N.W.2d at 849, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1171. 
53. Id. at 635, 358 N.W.2d at 855-56, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1185-86. Most 
commercially minded courts have been willing to accept the sufficiency of a writing if it provides for 
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The result is correct but, because of their obvious result orientation, both 
opinions are less than satisfactory. This is a perfect example of what could 
become standard practice if the U.C.C. fails to maintain its adaptability to 
current commercial practices. 
While the U.C.C. leaves little doubt that a partial payment will satisfy 
section 2-201 as to an apportionable part of the goods,54 it is silent whether a 
partial payment on an indivisible contract is sufficient to allow proof of the oral 
agreement. The seller's argument that oral proof should not be allowed was 
rejected in The Press, Inc. v. Fins & Feathers Publishing Co. 55 Strongly critical 
of the statute's potential for permitting escape from otherwise enforceable 
bargains, the court refused to broaden its scope by recognizing an indivisible 
contract exception to the partial payment exception.56 
Finally, while on the subject of payment, it should be mentioned that courts 
continue to adhere to the rule that the buyer's stopping of payment on a check 
does not strip it of its payment character.57 
BATTLE OF THE FORMS 
Several recurring issues under U.C.C. section 2-207 received attention in 
Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp. 58 The battle of the forms began when Pennwalt 
submitted a proposal, together with preprinted terms and conditions, for the sale 
of two rotary vacuum dryers. Among the terms and conditions were a limitation 
of liability clause and a clause providing a limitations period of one year from 
the date of delivery for any action for breach of warranty. Daitom responded 
with its purchase order and its preprinted terms and conditions, which included 
a reservation of all warranties and remedies available at law. Moreover, the 
purchase order provided that "acceptance by seller" was "expressly limited to 
such terms and conditions."59 When the dryers proved defective, Daitom sued. 
The district court entered summary judgment for Pennwalt, finding that the 
claim was barred by the one-year limitations period.60 
delivery of a party's requirements or output. See Leary & Frisch, General Provisions, Sales, Bulk 
Transfers, and Documents of Title, 40 Bus. Law. 1457 ( 1985 ). Admitting that a requirements term 
is specific enough to satisfy the statute, the majority refused to infer such a term because "not all 
distributorship agreements are requirements or output contracts." Id. at 612, 358 N.W.2d at 847, 
39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1171. 
54. See U.C.C. § 2-201, Comment 2 (1978) ("if the price has been paid, the seller can be forced 
to deliver an apportionable part of the goods"). 
55. 361N.W.2d171, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 33 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
56. Not clear from the court's opinion is what weight, if any, was accorded the fact that there 
was no quantity dispute. Id. at 174, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 36. 
57. Miller v. Wooters, 131 Ill. App. 3d 682, 476 N.E.2d 11, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
1623 (1985). 
58. 741F.2d1569, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1203 (10th Cir. 1984). 
59. Id. at 1575-76, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1212. 
60. Id. at 1573, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1207. Throughout the opinion the Tenth 
Circuit makes no effort to hide its sympathy for the buyer, Daitom, who because of circumstances 
beyond its control, could not within the one-year period try out the machinery and discover the 
defects. 
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The Tenth Circuit, applying nonexistent Pennsylvania law,61 reversed. It 
first rejected Daitom's contention that the acceptance of the original proposal 
was expressly contingent on Pennwalt's agreeing to the terms and conditions 
accompanying the purchase order. Absent was an explicit communication that 
Daitom would not proceed unless its terms were accepted by Pennwalt.62 
Having concluded that the exchanged writings formed a contract, the court's 
next job was to ascertain its terms. Believing that Daitom's reservation of its 
legal rights implicitly reserved the U.C.C.'s four-year period and remedies,63 the 
court applied the "knock-out" rule and held that the· conflicting terms in 
Pennwalt's offer and Daitom's acceptance cancelled one another. 64 Conse-
quently, in the absence of evidence of course of performance, course of dealing, 
or usage of trade, the U.C.C. will supply the missing terms. 
Notice that it is possible for a knocked-out term to become part of the contract 
if the created gap is filled by an identical term. In Pennwalt, if the U.C.C.'s gap 
fillers are used, the final contract will conform to Daitom's terms and condi-
tions. Should this be the result? The court is correct, however, in its view that 
before resorting to the U.C.C., course of performance, course of dealing, and 
usage of trade should be consulted for appropriate terms. 
Not surprisingly, U.C.C. section 2-207(2)(b) continues to be the subject of 
frequent litigation, forcing courts to decide whether additional provisions in the 
acceptance or confirmation materially alter the contract. Two recent cases have 
indicated that a clause providing for a one-year limitations period for bringing 
61. Pennwalt is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. 
Apparently for this reason the parties never disputed the application of Pennsylvania law to the 
warranty claims. Unfortunately, no Pennsylvania court had ever decided the exact issues raised by 
the case. 
62. 741 F.2d at 1577, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1214. The judicial trend favoring a 
narrow construction of the U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1978) proviso that an acceptance is not an acceptance 
if "expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms" shows no signs of 
abating (emphasis added). See also Challenge Mach. Co. v. Mattison Machine Works, 138 Mich. 
App. 15, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1578 (1984); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie 
Co., 125 Wis. 2d 418, 373 N.W.2d 65, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1192 (1985). Addition-
ally, the court thought the phrasing of the purchase order detracted from Daitom's argument of 
conditional acceptance. See 741 F.2d 1569, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1203. It read more 
like an offer than an acceptance. This reasoning underscores the observation in last year's survey of 
the importance of distinguishing between "offers" and "acceptances." See Leary & Frisch, General 
Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, 40 Bus. Law. 1467-68 (1985). Perhaps, 
if the purchase order had been labeled an offer, the court would have held that its terms were 
controlling. See U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(a) (1978). 
63. 741 F.2d at 1577-80, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1215-16, 1218-20. On this point 
the dissent differed. Judge Barrett argued that "[t]here was no term in Daitom's purchase order in 
conflict with the express one-year limitation." Id. at 1583, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 
1224. 
64. Id. at 1579-80, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1218-19. The "knock-out" rule is premised on the 
applicability of U.C.C. § 2-207(2) ( 1978) to additional terms only, not different terms. If the 
writings contain different terms, these terms will not become a part of the contract. For other 
decisions adopting this approach, see Challenge Mach. Co. v. Mattison Machine Co., 138 Mich. 
App. 15, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1578 (1984); St. Paul Structural Steel Co. v. ABI 
Contracting, Inc., 364 N.W.2d 83, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 789 (N.D. 1985). 
1374 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 41, August 1986 
suit is not a material alteration,65 and a third decided that a limitation of 
remedies clause is immaterial.66 On the other hand, a forum selection clause is a 
material alteration.67 
In another case,68 the Seventh Circuit, applying Wisconsin law, ruled that a 
disclaimer of implied warranties materially altered the original bargain of the 
parties. But as the court points out, this does not necessarily end the matter. 
There is always the possibility that the other party agreed to the additional 
term,69 and so it was in this case. The court found persuasive the district court's 
finding that the buyer was aware of the terms, assigned the limited warranty to 
its customers, and invoked the limited warranty on numerous occasions. Thus, 
according to the court, the buyer had "expressly agreed . . . by its course of 
conduct."70 
WARRANTIES 
GENERAL 
The usual mass of litigation on warranty issues, mostly routine and of minor 
significance, was found in the cases reported. A few had some interest. 
Uncooked pork hit the books again71 with apparently no consideration given 
to whether technological advances had occurred after the earlier precedent that 
was cited.72 Two cases held that guns with which one child killed another were 
"merchantable" as the ordinary purpose of a handgun is to fire a bullet, and 
each gun did. 73 The absence of a safety catch did not result in a breach of that 
warranty. In New Hampshire, the exploding bottle, this time containing cham-
pagne for sale in a state liquor store, raised an issue of sovereign immunity.74 If 
liability was in tort, the state had waived its immunity. The ruling was that the 
65. Acchione & Camesa, Inc. v. Reed Mining Tools, Inc., 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
1585 (E.D. Pa. 1984 ); Therma-Coustics Mfg. Co. v. Borden Inc., 213 Cal. Rptr. 611, 40 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1640 (1985). 
66. Kathenes v. Quick Chek Food Stores, 596 F. Supp. 713, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
1326 (D.N.J. 1984). 
67. Occidental Chem. Corp. v. H & W Indus., Inc., 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 756 
(E.D. Pa. 1985). 
68. Twin Disc, Inc. v. Big Bud Tractor, Inc., 772 F.2d 1329, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
1627 (7th Cir. 1985 ). 
69. See U.C.C. § 2-207, Comment 3 ( 1978). 
70. 772 F.2d at 1335, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1635 (emphasis added). 
71. Popour v. Holiday Food Center, Inc., 364 N.W.2d 764, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
1671 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985). 
72. Cf Clouser v. Shamokin Packing Co., 240 Pa. Super. 268, 361 A.2d 836 (1976), in which a 
motion to dismiss the complaint was denied. An allegation of negligence entitles plaintiff to prove 
that since the date of prior precedent a viable method of detecting trichinosis has been developed. 
73. Rhodes v. R.G. Industries, Inc., 173 Ga. App. 51, 325 S.E.2d 465, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 1668 (1984); Love v. Zales Corp., 689 S.W.2d 282, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
69 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). 
74. Sheehan v. New Hampshire Liquor Comm'n, 493 A.2d 494, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 1665 (N.H. 1985). 
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retailer's liability lay in contract, and for such actions immunity had not been 
waived. 
The Fourth Circuit, in a nonwarranty case, struggled with a statute changing 
privity rules. 75 The panel concluded that to avoid retroactivity in application, 
the change was effective only for sales occurring after the effective date. Hence, 
if the accident and injury occurred after the effect, but the sale was made before, 
the statute did not apply. The result is a logical application of contract 
principles, treating warranty as a contract term. 76 
The advantage of drafting to meet two possible characterizations of the 
transaction is shown in three cases involving leased chattels.77 In two of these, 
lessor warranties were disclaimed as if the provisions of article 2 applied.78 In 
the third the suit was against the seller to the lessor. Curiously, the purchase 
agreement was signed by the ultimate lessee, but was conditioned upon ob-
taining from AgriStor Leasing acceptable financing or a lease agreement. The 
disclaimers were held to be not conspicuous and hence unenforceable. 79 
The implied warranty of merchantability requires that the seller be a 
merchant.80 A Washington State court ruled that one who sold for the first time 
75. Farish v. Courion Indus., Inc., 754 F.2d 1111, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 857 (4th 
Cir. 1985). U.C.C. § 2-318 (Alt. C.) (1978) was enacted in 1965. It was construed as continuing a 
statute enacted in 1962. But the goods were manufactured prior to the effective date of the 1962 
statute, while the accidents occurred in 1979 and 1981. No statute of limitations point was raised. 
The decision was an en bane rehearing of two panel decisions. Nine judges sat. Four joined with 
Circuit Judge Sprouse's majority opinion. One judge concurred in a separate opinion and four 
judges dissented. The division was on what the Supreme Court of Virginia "would probably hold" 
on the issue, 754 F.2d at 1127, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 870. 
76. The case has significance if a change in U.C.C. § 2-318 (1978) from alternative A to 
alternative C is contemplated in any jurisdiction. Taking a similar contact term approach, the New 
York Court of Appeals in Heller v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
917 ( 1985) ruled that warranty suits against a remote manufacturer not filed within four years of 
sale to distributors, were time-barred without regard to the date of the sale to the purchaser 
claiming breach of warranty. At least one member of the Subcommittee believes that the key in each 
case should be the date the ultimate buyer or user first had contact with the product influenced by 
the manufacturer's advertising. In tort cases the privily rules should be considered procedural and 
the policy in favor of protecting against injury should be considered far stronger than privity rules. 
77. AgriStor Credit Corp. v. Schmidlin, 601 F. Supp. 1307, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
1653 (D. Ore. 1985); AgriStor Leasing v. Hansen, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1660 (D. 
Minn. 1985); AgriStor Leasing v. Kjergaard, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1667 (D. Minn. 
1985). The last two cases also held that a "finance lessor" was not a "merchant" for U.C.C. § 2-314 
purposes. 
78. See 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1660; 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1667. 
79. AgriStor Leasing v. Guggisberg, 617 F. Supp. 902, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1671 
(D. Minn. 1985). In the notice on the front about conditions of sale on the reverse only the word 
"NOTICE" was in all capitals and the text did not indicate that disclaimers of warranties were 
included. The disclaimers were in bold type on the reverse with a place where buyer would initial 
an acceptance. The buyer had not initialed. At the end of the text on the reverse side the sales person 
had signed. 
80. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1978). U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (1978) defines a "merchant" as one "who 
deals in goods of the kind" involved or holds himself out as having the knowledge or skill of those 
who do, or who employs an intermediary having such knowledge or skill. For some recent cases 
holding that a "finance lessor" is not a "merchant" for warranty purposes, see supra note 76. 
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had not achieved the status of a merchant in that sale.81 On the other side of the 
continent, a Massachusetts court gave merchant status to a public transportation 
authority selling its used railcars.82 
DISCLAIMERS AND LIMITED REMEDIES 
Provisions limiting a buyer's remedy to a return of the purchase price raise 
questions. Black letter law apparently provides that disclaimers of warranties 
are effective if made as provided in U.C.C. section 2-316.83 U.C.C. section 2-
718 provides for liquidated damages.84 U.C.C. section 2-719(3) makes a limita-
tion or exclusion of consequential damages subject to attack for unconscionabil-
ity.85 When seeds do not live up to the sales warranties, what damages are "the 
loss resulting in ordinary course of events from the seller's breach" under 
U.C.C. section 2-714(1),86 and what are consequential damages? In Harrison v. 
Funk Seeds lnternational,81 the South Dakota Supreme Court did not address 
this question specifically in holding unconscionable a disclaimer of warranties in 
accordance with U.C.C. section 2-316 and a limitation of remedy to a recovery 
by a farmer of the price paid for seeds. If the damages suffered when the corn 
grown from the seeds did not produce good ears of corn and did not make good 
silage were thought of as consequential, an application of the doctrine of 
unconscionability was invited.88 If the damages, cost of fertilizer, and loss of crop 
81. Fred J. Moore, Inc. v. Schinmann, 700 P.2d 754, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 741 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1985). 
82. Ferragamo v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 304 
(Mass. 1985 ). 
83. U.C.C. § 2-316(2), (3) ( 1978) requires either that the disclaimer be "conspicuous" and 
mention "merchantability" or be in words clearly indicating no warranty at all. 
84. U.C.C. § 2-718 (1978) requires that the amount be "reasonable in the light of the 
anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach" but only an "unreasonably large" amount is void 
as a penalty. A term limiting warranty recovery to a return of the purchase price will often be 
unreasonably small. As such it can only be attacked as not reasonable in the light of the harm caused 
by the breach. But see supra note 83. 
85. U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(a) (1978) provides that the agreement may limit "the buyer's remedies to 
... repayment of the price." Subsection (1 )(b) would permit this limit to be "expressly agreed to be 
exclusive" and hence a sole remedy. No controls for rendering such a clause unenforceable are 
specifically provided. Subsection (3) does subject exclusions of consequential damages to the test of 
unconscionability, but no such test (unless it can be found from§ 2-302 on general unconscionabil-
ity) applies to damages under U.C.C. § 2-714 (1978). Usually in statutory interpretation the 
particular (here U.C.C. § 2-719) controls the general (here U.C.C. § 2-302, in which unconscion-
ability is concerned). Comment 1 to U.C.C. § 2-719 (1978) indicates that the U.C.C. requires "at 
least a fair quantum of remedy." But is this legislating by Comment? 
86. u.c.c. § 2-714(1) (1978). 
87. 373 N.W.2d 30, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1244 (S.D. 1985). 
88. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1978). Indeed the court strongly relied on Durham v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 
315 N.W.2d 696, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 588 (S.D. 1982) a pesticide case in which there 
was a specific exclusion of consequential damages. That court held that the provisions of S.D. 
Codified Laws Ann.§ 38-21-46 (1976) requiring a filing with the state's Secretary of Agriculture 
within a prescribed time limit did not preempt the U.C.C. in actions for breach of contract. It 
nonetheless stated that the public policy of South Dakota as set forth in the Insecticide, Fungicide 
U.C.C. Survey: Sales 1377 
value were regarded as damages occurring in ordinary course because a good 
crop would have sold for enough to cover these items, then the court was 
obviously equating the reference to "a fair quantum of remedy" in Comment 1 
to U.C.C. section 2-71989 to the doctrine of unconscionability. The concept of an 
unreasonably small quantum of liquidated damages was not even mentioned.90 
If the court was ruling that a disclaimer of the implied warranty of 
merchantability could be unconscionable despite compliance with U.C.C. sec-
tion 2-316, it certainly did not say so.91 The case appears to rest on the disparity 
in bargaining power between the farmer purchaser and the seed merchant.92 A 
dissent by two judges indicates that when the seller sells a product of nature 
such as seeds as distinguished from a product fabricated by the seller, a 
plaintiff's burden to establish a defect should not be supplied by inference from 
a poor crop in certain areas of the farmer's land.93 
The case emphasizes the failure of article 2 of the U.C.C. to provide 
guidelines on the difficult question of when damages are ordinary and when 
they are consequential.94 If, however, the requirement of a fair quantum of 
remedy is equated to a conscionable limitation of remedy, perhaps one of the 
greatest needs for a clear distinction vanishes.95 
The division of authority on whether the failure of the essential purpose of a 
limited remedy for breach of warranty also destroys a provision excluding 
recovery for consequential damages continues as additional jurisdictions take 
sides on the issue. 96 
and Rodenticide Act of 1947, S.D. Codified Laws Ann.§§ 38-20A-1 to -53 was to protect farmers 
"from the consequences of the sale, delivery, and use of falsely labeled pesticides." This aided the 
court in finding that the exclusion of consequential damages was unconscionable. The court in 
Hanson did not state whether the damages were U.C.C. § 2-714(1) damages or U.C.C. § 2-715 
damages, and did not refer to the South Dakota or Federal Seed Laws for a declaration of policy. 
See cases cited supra note 34. 
89. Comment 1 also states that "it is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least minimum 
adequate remedies be available." Apparently the subsequent reference in the same comment is to 
"at least a fair quantum of remedy." The Comment invites the courts to strike clauses that purport 
to limit "the remedial provisions of this Article in an unconscionable manner." It is not specifically 
stated whether less than a fair quantum or below minimum adequate is per se unconscionable. 
90. Perhaps counsel did not equate the dollar figure of the price with the liquidated damages 
concept. 
91. The opinion relies on Durham, 315 N.W.2d at 696, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 
588. The terms ofU.C.C. § 2-316 (1978) are not discussed. 
92. 373 N.W.2d at 35, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1251. 
93. See dissent of Justices Miller and Wollman, 373 N.W.2d at 37, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) at 1252. 
94. U.C.C. § 2-714 (1978) refers to loss resulting in ordinary course from the breach. U.C.C. 
§ 2-715 (1978) purports to define incidental and consequential damages, but it is not clear when 
damages "resulting from general ... needs of which the seller at time of contracting had reason to 
know" pass from ordinary damages into consequential damages. 
95. That is, both kinds are under "unconscionability" control with respect to limitations. A 
sticky question remains, however: Where does an exclusion of consequential damages begin to take 
hold if there is no exclusive stated remedy? 
96. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Waterson, 13 Ark. App. 77, 679 S.W.2d 814, 40 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1721 (1984) (consequentials recoverable); R. W. Murray Co. v. Shatter-
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THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES 
Perhaps the most interesting case in the period under review is Judge 
Pollock's opinion in Spring Motors Distributors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. 91 for the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey. Reversing the New Jersey Appellate Division, 
the court first held that recovery of economic loss between sophisticated parties 
could not be had in New Jersey in an action for strict liability in tort or 
negligence. Warranty liability was the sole source for any such recovery. It then 
stated that absence of vertical privity between the ultimate buyer and the maker 
of a defective transmission would not bar warranty recovery. Since plaintiff did 
not, however, file for a review of the dismissal of its warranty claims as time-
barred under U.C.C. section 2-725, there was no recovery. 
TITLE, CREDITORS-GOOD FAITH PURCHASERS 
AND ENTRUSTING 
A case of great potential significance is Placer Coal, Inc. v. Rhondale Coal 
Services Co., /nc.98 In Placer, coal sold to Rhondale was delivered to Placer for 
processing and shipment to buyers nominated by Rhondale. In due course, 
Rhondale found itself indebted to Placer in the approximate amount of $24,000 
and unable to pay sellers from whom it had purchased coal on credit. Placer 
filed suit against Rhondale and at the same time sought a prejudgment attach-
ment of the coal in Placer's possession. Before the coal was lawfully seized 
pursuant to Placer's attachment, Rhondale informed its sellers that it could not 
proof Glass Corp., 758 F.2d 266, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1283 (8th Cir. 1985) (same); 
Fiorito Bros., Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp., 747 F.2d 1309; 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1298 (9th 
Cir. 1984) (same); Carboline Co. v. Oxmoor Centers, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1728 (Ky. 
Ct. App. (1985)) (exclusion remains enforceable in a commercial setting, but a limitation on 
incidental damages disappears); Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 761 F.2d 553, 40 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1714 (9th Cir. 1985) and AgriStor Credit Corp. v. Schmidlin, 601 
F. Supp. 1307, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1653 (D. Ore. 1985) (both requiring full trial 
before such determination can be made). 
97. 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1184 (1985). While, due to 
the time bar of U.C.C. § 2-725 ( 1978), no warranty issues were technically raised, it is of interest 
that the court stated that one issue was "whether the Code provides the exclusive remedies" to the 
plaintiff who had suffered only "economic" losses. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N .J. 
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) and Santor v. A.&M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305, 2 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 599 ( 1965) were distinguished as based on factual situations 
occurring before New Jersey adopted the U.C.C. and related to consumer transactions. Later strict-
liability cases were also found to relate to consumer transactions. In Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 
Cal. 2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 915 (1965) the court 
noted that it had rejected Santor and had emerged as representing the majority view, well liked by 
various commentators. The court discusses at length the difference between vertical privity and 
horizontal privity, concluding that the Code drafters have left the courts to determine whether 
vertical privity should be required in a warranty action, citing among other cases abolishing the 
vertical privily bar Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968). Judge Handler 
concurred, arguing that the majority did not need to go as far on privily as they had done because 
the plaintiff had specified to Ford who should make the transmissions, and this should have resulted 
in privity between plaintiff and its designated party to supply transmissions. 
98. 684 S.W.2d 25, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1697 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984). 
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pay for the coal and that they were free to take it back. It was following this 
renunciation by Rhondale of its interest in the coal that the attachment on 
behalf of Placer became effective. 
In a conversion suit brought by the sellers against Placer, recovery was 
allowed. The court conceded that title had passed to Rhondale when the coal 
was delivered to Placer's dock99 and that the sellers had failed to comply with 
section 2-702(2). 100 But as the court saw it, there is section 2-401 ( 4) that will 
cause a revestiture of title in the seller upon "(a] rejection or other refusal by the 
buyer to receive or retain the goods, whether or not justified.101 The court 
believed that because Rhondale told the sellers to come and get it before the coal 
was taken pursuant to Placer's attachment, it was no longer the property of 
Rhondale, and hence, the attachment was wrongful. 102 The dissent, on the other 
hand, saw things differently. Judge Gudgel believed that section 2-401 ( 4) 
applies only when the goods are rejected because they are in some way deficient, 
not when the deficiency relates to the buyer's ability to pay, as here. 103 
Because the majority never acknowledged the possibility that the subsection's 
scope might be anything other than readily apparent from its language, the 
potential effect of the decision is ignored. While it is certainly true that a buyer 
has the right to return goods to the seller and that there is a point in the course 
of their return when they will no longer be subject to the claims of the buyer's 
other creditors, it is questionable whether that point is reached before the goods 
leave the buyer's control. To sanction an interest in the seller that is secret so far 
as the rest of the world is concerned could have an untoward impact on those 
who subsequently deal with the buyer104 and is at odds with the drafters' 
approach in other U.C.C. sections.105 
A case involving a related issue is Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & 
Moyer Garage, lnc. 106 The Fire Co. contracted to purchase a fire truck and paid 
$48,000 toward a purchase price of approximately $52,000. The seller, who 
was assembling the truck, had ordered the chassis from Lowe & Moyer. Before 
completing the truck, but after painting the Fire Co.'s name on the cab, the 
99. The contracts between Rhondale and the sellers provided for delivery of the coal F.O.B. 
Placer's dock. Title, therefore, passed to Rhondale when the coal was delivered to Placer. See 
u.c.c. § 2-40J(2) (J978). 
100. U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (1978) gives a credit seller the right to reclaim goods from an insolvent 
buyer if demand for their return is made within J 0 days following their receipt by buyer. 
JOI. U.C.C. § 2-40J(4) (J978). 
J02. For the attachment to be valid, the property seized must be property of the debtor. See Ky. 
Rev. Stat.§ 425.30J (J 984 Cum. Supp.). This would not be the case if title to the coal had returned 
to the sellers by operation ofU.C.C. § 2-40J(4) (J978). 
J03. 684 S.W.2d at 30-3J, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at J704. 
J04. For this reason the law, in the guise of fraudulent conveyance law, has historically 
condemned those arrangements resulting in a separation of ownership and possession. See generally 
J G. Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences §§ 342-363 (rev. ed. 1940). 
JOS. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-402(2) ( J 978) (permitting under certain circumstances the application 
of state fraudulent conveyance law to a buyer who leaves sold goods with the seller); § 2-326(3) 
(penalizing a consignor's secret interest); § 9-30J (penalizing a secured party's secret interest). 
J06. 338 Pa. Super. 257, 487 A.2d 953, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) J691 (1985). 
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seller found itself unable to pay for the chassis and surrendered the partially 
completed truck to Lowe & Moyer. The Fire Co. then filed suit seeking to 
replevy the truck. 
The Pennsylvania Superior Court correctly observed that the Fire Co. had to 
prove that it had a better right to possess the truck than Lowe & Moyer but 
incorrectly concluded that that right depended on it being a buyer in ordinary 
course under section 2-403(2).107 Because Lowe & Moyer had passed title to 
the chassis to the seller upon delivery to seller, section 2-403(2) was not needed 
to create in the seller any power to transfer any interest of Lowe & Hammer to 
a third party.108 They had no interest until they received the surrender. Never-
theless, the opinion nicely summarized the conflicting views on when buyer in 
ordinary course status attaches and is for this reason worth reading. The court 
eventually decided that identification of the good to the contract is what triggers 
buyer status, and the Fire Co. thus qualified when its name was put on the 
cab.109 Confusing the concepts of replevin from the seller and replevin from a 
third party, the court then remanded the case to determine whether any effort to 
cover by the Fire Co. would have been unavailing. 110 The case again indicates 
the conceptual difficulties facing attempts to secure protection for the interests of 
a financing buyer outside of compliance with article 9. 
RISK OF LOSS 
Although at this stage in the life of the U.C.C. it is a bit unusual to find cases 
of universal first impression, they still manage to arise. In Jason's Foods, Inc. v. 
Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 111 the novel issue facing the Seventh Circuit was 
whether section 2-509(2)(b), which provides that when "goods are held by a 
bailee to be delivered without being moved, the risk of loss passes to the buyer 
... (b) on acknowledgment by the bailee of the buyer's right to possession of the 
107. U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (1978) provides: "[a]ny entrusting or possession of goods to a merchant 
who deals in goods or that kind gives him power to transrer all rights or the entruster to a buyer in 
ordinary course or business." Here, however, title and possession had passed from Lowe & Moyer, 
the return was voluntary and would be subject to any rights or the Fire Co. 
108. A better approach would have applied U .C.C. § 2-402( 1 ), which, subject to certain 
exceptions, makes the rights or seller's creditors subject to the buyer's rights to recover the goods 
under U.C.C. §§ 2-502 and 2-716 {1978). The court does mention § 2-402(1) but rejects its 
application because the Fire Co. never raised this theory of recovery. 338 Pa. Super. at 268 n.5, 487 
A.2d at 959 n.5, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1698 n.5. 
109. Because the truck was not in existence when the contract was made, it was a "foture good" 
whose identification occurred when it was designated by the seller as "[the good] to which the 
contract refors." U.C.C. § 2-501(1)(b) {1978). 
110. u.c.c. § 2-716 (1978) permits replevin "for goods identified to the contract ir arter 
reasonable effort [the buyer] is unable to effect cover ... or the circumstances reasonably indicate 
that such effort will be unavailing." Because ability to cover is only relevant ir U.C.C. § 2-716 is, 
there is no reason for the court to consider its availability in this case. Because U.C.C. § 2-402(1) 
(1978) played no role in the decision, see supra note 108, and replevin was not being sought from 
the seller, the question or cover seems entirely misplaced. 
111. 774 F.2d 214, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1287 (7th Cir. 1985). 
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goods," 112 is satisfied if the acknowledgment is made to the seller. 113 In this case, 
the subject of the sale, pork ribs, was to be delivered by a transfer of the ribs 
from the seller's account in an independent warehouse to the buyer's account. 
On J ariuary 13, the change was made pursuant to the seller's instruction, but a 
new warehouse receipt was not mailed to the buyer until January 17 or 
January 18. It was not until the buyer received the receipt on January 24 that it 
knew the transfer had taken place. Unfortunately, the ribs were destroyed by a 
fire at the warehouse on January 17. In a suit by the seller to recover the 
contract price, the trial court entered summary judgment for the buyer because, 
at the time of the fire, the risk of loss had not yet passed. 
Unable to justify a result in favor of either party on policy grounds,114 the 
Seventh Circuit affirmed in an opinion characterized by Judge Posner as "a 
rather dry textual analysis."115 Relying on the language of section 2-509(2)(b) 
and its surrounding subsections,116 the U.C.C. comments, and section 2-
503( 4)(a),117 the court thought that the risk of loss clearly did not pass when the 
book transfer was made, even though the seller knew of the transfer. Because 
the seller had never raised the point, the court refused to decide when the risk 
did pass to the buyer; that is, did "acknowledgment" to the buyer take place 
when the receipt was mailed or when it was received? Regardless, the case 
serves as stern warning that risk of loss, not the location of title, should control 
the decision to insure. 118 It is, therefore, sometimes wise to insure against goods 
not owned and perhaps even against goods one does not know are owned. 
Section 2-509( 1) sets forth the risk of loss rules that govern if the seller is 
required or authorized to ship goods by carrier. Which of its rules apply will, in 
turn, depend on the parties' agreement. 119 Frequently they will express their 
intention by using standard trade terms or symbols, the consequences of many of 
which are spelled out in U.C.C. section 2-320, which instructs that when the 
112. U.C.C. § 2-509(2)(b) (1978) (emphasis added). 
113. Because the alleged acknowledgment was to the seller, the court raised but did not decide 
the question of whether acknowledgment to a third party may ever suffice. 774 F.2d at 217-18, 41 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1290. 
114. The court thought the position of both parties equal from the standpoint of their ability to 
prevent or insure against the loss. Id. at 218, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1292. 
115. Id. 774 F.2d at 218, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1291. 
116. u.c.c. § 2-509(2)(b) (1978). 
117. This section permits a seller to tender delivery of goods by obtaining the bailee's acknowl-
edgment when the goods are to be delivered without being moved. 
118. At the time of the fire, title to the ribs had passed to the buyer. 77 4 F.2d at 217, 41 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1290. See U.C.C. § 2-401(3)(b) (1978). Another case decided during the 
survey period with the same message was Taylor & Martin, Inc. v. Hiland Dairy, Inc., 676 S.W.2d 
859, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1672 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). There it was held that risk of 
loss passed even though there was noncompliance with the state certificate of title act and, as a 
result, title might not have passed. 
119. u.c.c. § 2-509( 1) ( 1978). 
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term "C.I.F." is used, the risk of loss passes to the buyer upon shipment. 120 But, 
as a recent case illustrates, this presumed agreement is always subject to an 
actual agreement otherwise. 
In Kumar Corp. v. Nopal Lines, Ltd., 121 the goods were to be shipped from 
Miami to Venezuela, C.I.F. Maracaibo, Venezuela. Following their delivery to 
the freight handler and their disappearance to ports unknown, the seller 
brought suit against the handler, the carrier, and the carrier's shipping agent. 
The defendants' position was that the risk of loss had passed to the buyer and 
that therefore the buyer, not the seller, was the real party in interest with 
standing to sue. Because a C.l.F. contract is ordinarily a shipment contract with 
the risk of loss passing to the buyer once the goods are delivered for shipment, 
the trial court agreed and granted the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment.122 
According to Florida's Third District Court of Appeals, the case was more 
complicated. Contradicting the usual effect of a C.l.F. term was a statement in 
the contract that the buyer would not pay until the goods were actually sold in 
Venezuela. 123 Because this time-of-payment term made the parties' intentions 
ambiguous, the court thought the summary judgment improper. 124 The question 
for the trier of fact was whether payment was required only if the goods arrived 
in Venezuela125 or whether it was nonetheless due on the date when the goods 
would have arrived had they not been lost. 126 One curious feature of the case is 
the failure of the seller to procure insurance. This alone should have prevented 
the risk from shifting to the buyer. 127 
120. U.C.C. § 2-320 ( 1978), Official Comment 1 ("The C.l.F. contract is not a destination but a 
shipment contract with risk of subsequent loss or damage to the goods passing to the buyer upon 
shipment if the seller has properly performed all his obligations with respect to the goods"). 
121. 462 So. 2d 1178, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
122. Id. at 1183-84, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 73. The trial court also rejected the 
seller's argument that it had standing to sue as the buyer's agent. It held that the buyer's purported 
ratification of the suit came too late because it was made when an independent claim by the buyer 
was time-barred under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1303(6) (1982). 
123. Id. at 1184, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 75. U.C.C. § 2-320( 4) ( 1978) provides: 
"Under the term C.I.F. or C. & F. unless otherwise agreed the buyer must make payment against 
tender of the required documents and the seller may not tender nor the buyer demand delivery of the 
goods in substitution for the documents." 
124. The court, assuming the risk of loss had passed, also saw no reason why the seller could not 
maintain the action as agent of the buyer notwithstanding that the original filing was unauthorized. 
In the court's opinion any ratification would relate back and supply the needed authority. Id. at 
1185, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 77. 
125. A result inconsistent with the nature of a C.l.F. contract. 
126. A result consistent with the nature of a C.l.F. contract. See U.C.C. § 2-321(3) (1978). 
127. A C.l.F. contract requires the seller to obtain insurance. See U.C.C. § 2-320(2)(c) (1978). 
The court did not decide whether an agreement that the buyer could have the goods on consignment 
would affect the risk of loss in transit. 
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TENDER, CURE, AND NOTICE OF BREACH 
Are attorneys' fees recoverable in an indemnity action by a retailer against 
the manufacturer of defective goods? The answer apparently is in dispute. 128 
The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the retailer's attorneys' fees were not 
recoverable in Contractor's Lumber & Supply Co. v. Champion International 
Corp. 129 In that case the retailer incurred attorneys' fees defending a claim 
against it by its customer. The manufacturer, who had also been sued by the 
customer, settled the customer's claims against both itself and the retailer. The 
trial court then dismissed the retailer's indemnity claim. The supreme court 
affirmed the dismissal upon the ground that the retailer had failed to tender 
defense of the customer's claim against it to the manufacturer under section 2-
607( 5 )(a).130 
REPUDIATION AND EXCUSE 
In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Decker Coal Co.,131 a federal district court 
stated that a repudiation must be clear and unequivocal. Buyer had the 
contractual right to accelerate the delivery date of a coal installment from 1990 
to 1985. The buyer demanded acceleration of the delivery date to 1984. The 
seller responded that buyer could accelerate the delivery to a date no earlier 
than 1986. The seller's response also asked buyer to contact it to discuss the 
dispute and agreed to buyer's demand for accelerated delivery of coal under 
another contract. According to the court, the seller's response was not an 
anticipatory repudiation of its obligation to deliver the coal in 1985. The court 
reasoned that even though the seller's response claimed more than the seller was 
permitted under the contract, the overall accommodating tone of the letter made 
it less than a positive and unequivocal repudiation. 132 Consequently the court 
denied buyer's motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
In International Minerals and Chemical Corp. v. Llano, Inc.,133 the buyer 
agreed to pay for certain minimum quantities of natural gas for its fertilizer 
plant whether or not it actually used such minimum quantities. Subsequently, 
the state promulgated environmental regulations requiring buyer to alter its 
manufacturing process so as to use less than the contracted minimum quantities 
of gas. In reversing a $3.4-million judgment for seller, the Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit held that the buyer was excused by a contract clause from its 
obligation to pay for the contracted minimum quantities. The clause provided in 
128. See cases cited in George E. Jensen Contractor, Inc. v. Quality Mill Works, Inc., 431 So. 
2d 1232 (Ala. 1983). 
129. 463 So. 2d 1084; 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 481(Miss.1985). 
130. The court's reliance upon U.C.C. § 2-607(5)(a) is puzzling. That subsection does not deal 
with the substantive right to bring an indemnity action. It deals only with the procedure of binding 
the indemnitor to relevant facts found in the claim against the indemnitee. See U.C.C. § 2-
607(5)(a), Comment 7 (1978); see also U.C.C. § 3-803, Comment (1978). 
131. 612 F. Supp. 978, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1703 (N.D. Ill. 1985). 
132. See also U.C.C. § 2-610, Comment 2. 
133. 770 F.2d 879, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 347 (10th Cir. 1985). 
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relevant part, "[I] n the event that . . . [b] uyer is 'unable to receive gas as 
provided in this Contract for any reason beyond the reasonable control of the 
parties ... an appropriate adjustment in the minimum purchase requirements 
... shall be made.' " 134 The court construed the word "unable" in the clause to 
mean "impracticable" under U.C.C. section 2-615. It then concluded that 
compliance with a supervening state environmental regulation rendered imprac-
ticable the buyer's obligation to receive the contracted minimum quantities, thus 
triggering an appropriate reduction of the buyer's minimum purchase obliga-
tion under the quoted clause. 135 The court rejected the seller's argument that 
buyer's voluntary early compliance with the regulation did not constitute 
supervening legal impracticability. 
A forty percent decrease in the market price of pinto beans was held as a 
matter of law not to excuse under U.C.C. section 2-615 a buyer from its fixed 
price obligation to purchase such beans in Lawrance v. Elmore Bean Ware-
house, lnc. 136 There the contract was between a bean warehouse and grower. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals ruled that U.C.C. section 2-615 applied to buyers. 
The nonoccurrence of a decline in market price was ruled not a basic assump-
tion upon which this contract was made, however. The court stated that the 
basic assumption test was a question of foreseeability. It reasoned that since 
changing market conditions were the norm, they usually were foreseeable unless 
the party seeking excuse could show that it could operate only at a loss if it were 
not excused and that the loss would be so severe and unreasonable that failure to 
excuse would result in a grave injustice. The buyer's mere assertion that it 
would be driven to bankruptcy if it were not excused was rejected by the court 
as not supported by specific facts. 137 
REMEDIES 
REJECTION AND REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE 
Does the failure to include a spare tire with a new automobile constitute a 
substantial impairment in the value of the automobile so that the buyer can 
revoke acceptance of the automobile? The Michigan Supreme Court said it did 
in Colonial Dodge, Inc. v. Miller. 138 In reversing both the trial and intermediate 
appellate courts, the supreme court applied a subjective test of substantial 
impairment139 and concluded that the test was satisfied on the facts. 
The buyer has properly revoked his acceptance for nonconformity under 
U.C.C. section 2-608( 1 )(b). Does the seller have the right to an opportunity to 
cure the nonconformity? The Alabama Supreme Court held that the seller had 
134. Id. at 882, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 350. 
135. Id. at 887, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 356-57. See U.C.C. § 2-615(a), Comment 
10 (1978). 
136. 108 Idaho 892, 702 P.2d 930, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 358 (1985). 
137. Id. at 894-95, 702 P.2d at 933, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 362. 
138. 420 Mich. 452, 362 N.W.2d 704, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1 (1984). 
139. See U.C.C. § 2-608, Comment 2 (1978). 
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no such right of opportunity to cure in American Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. 
Boyd. 140 There, an automobile damaged en route to the United States was 
repaired at the port of entry by the manufacturer, then shipped to the dealer 
who unwittingly sold the automobile as "new" to the plaintiff. In affirming a 
judgment against the manufacturer on an inter alia theory of breach of war-
ranty, the court held that the manufacturer had no right to an opportunity to 
cure under U.C.C. section 2-608(1)(b). The court reasoned that because the 
subsection said nothing about an opportunity to cure, the manufacturer's claim 
that it had a right to attempt cure was not well founded. 141 
In a related statutory development, Arizona amended and reenacted the 
U.C.C. Among the amendments, a fourth subdivision was added to U.C.C. 
section 2-608 providing that the provisions of that section do not apply to a new 
motor vehicle subject to Arizona's "lemon law." 142 The effect of this amendment 
apparently is to allow a buyer to revoke acceptance only if so permitted under 
the lemon law. 
RECLAMATION 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Collingwood Grain, Inc. v. Coast 
Trading Co.,143 discussed several questions relative to a seller's U.C.C. section 
2-702 reclamation rights in bankruptcy. Buyer contracted with three stockyards 
to supply them with grain, then entered into two contracts with seller for eight 
carloads of grain to fulfill its obligations to the stockyards. The grain was 
shipped directly to the stockyards. Buyer paid for the grain with drafts, which 
were later dishonored. Within ten days of the seller's deliveries to the stock-
yards, the buyer petitioned for bankruptcy. Seller obtained payment for two 
carloads. It sent notification to the stockyards that it was reclaiming the 
remaining grain. The stockyards, in response to competing claims by seller and 
buyer, deposited the money owed for the grain with the bankruptcy court. That 
court held that seller was entitled to the money. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 
reversed on all but one carload of grain. 
First, the court held that U.C.C. section 2-702 applies to ostensible cash 
sales. 144 Then it held that the stockyards were bona fide purchasers for value 
who took free of seller's reclamation rights pursuant to U.C.C. sections 2-702(3) 
and 2-403(1)(b)(c). That the seller delivered directly to the stockyards did not 
affect the application of 2-403(1), said the court. Finally, the court held that the 
140. 475 So. 2d 835, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 410 (Ala. 1985). 
141. Id. at 841, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 413. In his dissent, Chief Justice Torbert 
noted that there appears to be a split of opinion, nationwide, on this question. Id. at 841, 41 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. at 414. The cases are collected in 4 R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code§ 2-608: 14 
& 15 (3d ed. 1983 and Supp. 1985). See also U.C.C. § 2-711, Comment 1 (1978). 
142. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47-26080 (1985 Special Pamphlet). The citation for Arizona's 
"lemon law" is Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§§ 44-1261 to -1265 (1985 Supp. Pamphlet). 
143. 744 F.2d 686, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 753 (9th Cir. 1984). 
144. Id. at 689-90, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 356. See U.C.C. § 2-507, Comment 3 
(1978). 
1386 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 41, August 1986 
seller was not entitled to reclaim under U.C.C. section 2-702 the proceeds of the 
grain sales deposited by the stockyards with the bankruptcy court. 145 It held that 
the seller's reclamation rights under that section extended only to the goods 
themselves, not proceeds of the goods. 146 
In In re Storage Technology Corp., 141 a bankruptcy court held that an unpaid 
seller seeking reclamation of goods in bankruptcy under Bankruptcy Code 
section 546(c)148 and U.C.C. section 2-702 must show that the debtor was 
"insolvent" as that term is defined in the Bankruptcy Code, 149 not as it is defined 
in the U.C.C. 150 Section 546(c) protects a reclaiming seller's statutory or 
common-law rights from avoidance by the bankruptcy trustee provided, inter 
alia, that the debtor received the goods while "insolvent." This language is 
similar to that of U.C.C. section 2-702, the seller's statutory right of reclama-
tion. Thus arose the question of whether the drafters used "insolvency" in 
section 546(c) in the sense in which it was used in U.C.C. section 2-702 or in 
the sense in which it is generally used in the Bankruptcy Code. The court 
applied the Bankruptcy Code definition. 151 
SELLER'S MONEY REMEDIES 
Sellers who finance the acquisition of goods they sell fare poorly in recovering 
additional finance charges they incur when their buyers do not pay on time. 
Three cases denied recovery, although on different theories. 152 
In Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 153 the parties 
made two contracts for the sale of large quantities of steel slabs for a total price 
of approximately $7.4 million. The contracts contained no provisions for inter-
145. Id. at 690-91, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 756-59. The seller was held entitled to 
an administrative priority for the proceeds of one carload of grain because the obligation to deliver 
that carload had been executory at the time of bankruptcy. Id. at 692, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) at 760. 
146. The court noted that seller had not argued, and so the court did not decide, whether U.C.C. 
§ 2-702 creates a security interest cognizable under article 9. Id. at 691, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) at 759. See U.C.C. § 9-113 (1978). Presumably, had the seller so argued, it could then 
have argued that it was entitled to the proceeds under U.C.C. § 9-306 (1978). 
147. 48 Bankr. 862, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1178 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985). 
148. 11U.S.C.§546(c) (1982). 
149. The Bankruptcy Code adopts the so-called balance-sheet definition of insolvency (debts 
greater than assets) as the sole definition of insolvency. 11U.S.C.§101(29) (Supp. II 1984). 
150. The U.C.C. includes the Bankruptcy Code's definition of insolvency in its definition but 
also adds the so-called equity definition of insolvency (ceasing to pay debts in ordinary course of 
business or inability to pay debts as they become due). See U.C.C. § 1-201(23) (1978). 
151. See also In re Furniture Distribs., Inc., 45 Bankr. 38, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
1276 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (dictum); contra International Crude Corp., Case No. 1-82-00085 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex.) (unpublished opinion discussed in the principal case); see generally Mann & 
Phillips, Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act: An Imperfect Resolution of the Conflict 
Between the Reclaiming Seller and the Bankruptcy Trustee, 54 Am. Bankr. L.J. 239 ( 1980). 
152. For cases permitting recovery, see the federal district court's opinion in Associated Metals 
& Minerals Corp. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 590 F. Supp. 18, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 892 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), a.ff'd mem. 742 F.2d 1431 (2d Cir. 1983). 
153. Id. 
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est on late payments. Seller financed its acquisition of the steel apparently at 
interest rates far above the legal prejudgment interest rate. Seller delivered the 
steel. Buyer paid the contract price, but late. Seller sued to recover $104,000 of 
additional financing charges it incurred as a result of buyer's late payments. On 
cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court held buyer liable for 
only $35,000, the amount of interest on the late payments computed at the legal 
prejudgment interest rate. The court, in effect, ruled out recovery of the 
additional financing charges as incidental damages under U.C.C. section 2-710 
because the buyer already paid the contract price. The court stated that 
incidental damages were available under section 2-710 only in conjunction with 
specific rights of action recognized by article 2, including a price action. The 
court concluded that seller had no such rights of action. A price action was ruled 
out by the court on the ground that buyer already had paid the contract price.154 
Next the court held the additional financing charges to be unrecoverable as 
consequential damages on the ground that sellers are not entitled to consequen-
tial damages under the U.C.C. The court then found buyer liable for prejudg-
ment interest at the legal rate under U.C.C. section 1-103 and applicable 
Pennsylvania law. 155 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judg-
ment without opinion. 156 
In MH & H Implement, Inc. v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 151 the parties were a 
farm implement manufacturer and a dealer who sold and serviced the manufac-
turer's products. The dealer encountered financial trouble and went out of 
business. The resulting termination of the dealership agreement between the 
parties triggered a statutory obligation of the manufacturer to repurchase the 
dealer's inventory of parts. The dealer returned its parts to the manufacturer 
and, anticipating the manufacturer's payment, borrowed money to wind up its 
affairs. 158 The parties disagreed on the amount owed by the manufacturer. The 
dealer sued the manufacturer for damages, including the additional interest on 
its borrowing that accrued as a result of manufacturer's alleged failure to make 
timely payment for the parts. The trial court resolved the payment dispute in 
dealer's favor and awarded damages including the additional interest. On 
appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals reversed that part of the judgment awarding 
as damages the dealer's additional interest. The court concluded that the interest 
154. Id. at 20-21, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 895-96. It is possible that the seller 
should have a price action entitling it to incidental damages even when the buyer pays the price late, 
for then the buyer has failed "to pay the price as it becomes due." U.C.C. § 2-709(1) (1978). 
Otherwise, the situation may arise in which the seller who sues for his or her price is entitled to 
incidental damages, but the seller who accepts a late payment of the price before suit forgoes his or 
her right to incidental damages caused by the late payment. 
155. Id. at 22-23, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 897-98. The court rejected under 
U.C.C. § 2-202 buyer's proffered evidence of a course of dealing not to charge interest on late 
payments as being inconsistent with specific payment terms set forth in the written contracts. 
156. 742 F.2d 1431 (2d Cir. 1983). 
157. 108 Idaho 879, 702 P.2d 917, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 467 (1985). 
158. The dealer secured its loan by assigning to the lender its right to payment for parts 
returned to the manufacturer. Id. at 882, 702 P.2d at 920, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 469. 
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expense was not an incidental damage under U.C.C. section 2-710.159 It distin-
guished cases cited by the dealer permitting recovery of interest charges arising 
when sellers borrowed money to produce or purchase the goods sold. In those 
cases, said the court, there was a direct link between the buyer's breach and the 
seller's cost. It declared that no such link existed in the principal case because 
the dealer borrowed not to acquire the parts sold but to defray general expenses 
of winding up the business. The court also concluded that the additional 
interest was not recoverable as consequential damages because they were not 
shown to have been within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the 
time they entered into the dealership agreement. 160 
In Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 161 the parties negotiated 
for the sale of a large quantity of shredded scrap iron at a fixed price. The 
market price declined and the sale was never consummated. The seller resold 
the scrap and sued for damages, including interest paid on money it had 
borrowed to finance the acquisition of junk cars that it shredded to produce the 
scrap iron in question. The federal district court found that the parties had 
entered into a valid contract that buyer had breached by refusing to take the 
scrap. It awarded seller resale damages under U.C.C. section 2-706(1) but 
declined to grant seller recovery for interest paid on the money it had borrowed 
to finance the acquisition of the scrap. It stated that the interest was not a 
consequential damage because the borrowing was not something contemplated 
by the parties or foreseen by buyer. The court characterized the interest as 
merely a cost of doing business, not an item of incidental damages. 
Suppose that a buyer does not cover and its actual loss is much less than 
U.C.C. section 2-713 market damages. Are such a buyer's damages limited to its 
actual loss? A California Court of Appeals so limited the buyer's damages in 
Allied Canners & Packers, Inc. v. Victor Packing Co. 162 There a packing 
company contracted to sell raisins to an exporter at a fixed price. The exporter 
had entered into two fixed-price resale contracts. Before delivery, the raisin crop 
was adversely affected by rains, thus causing an increase in market price. 
Packer was unable to obtain raisins from its supplier and breached its contract 
with the exporter. Exporter did not cover; however, it managed to have one of 
the resale contracts rescinded. The other resale buyer demanded delivery but 
never sued the exporter nor did the exporter voluntarily pay any damages to it. 
Thus exporter's actual loss was only $4400, its lost profits on the two resale 
contracts. Exporter sued packer for approximately $150,000, the market-con-
159. Id. The court found that the manufacturer's obligation to repurchase was a sale under 
U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1978) so that article 2 applied even though the repurchase obligation was 
created by statute. 
160. The court did not discuss the rule that sellers are not entitled to consequential damages 
under the U.C.C., e.g., Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 590 F. Supp. 
18, 399 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), ajf'd mem., 742 F.2d 1431 (2d Cir. 
1983). 
161. 592 F. Supp. 446, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 911 (E.D. Wis. 1984). 
162. 162 Cal. App. 3d 905, 209 Cal. Rptr. 60, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1567 (1984). 
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tract price differential under U.C.C. section 2-713. The court affirmed the trial 
court's judgment limiting the exporter's recovery to its actual loss. 163 
Can a buyer recover compensation for the goodwill of its customers lost as a 
result of the seller's breach? One case permitted recovery; one case denied it. 164 
Damages for buyer's lost customer goodwill were permitted by the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Delano Growers' Cooperative Winery v. 
Supreme Wine Co. 165 There a winery sold tainted wine to a bottler who resold 
it. Later the bottler received complaints from its customers. Eventually the 
bottler liquidated. The winery sued the bottler for the price of the wine and the 
bottler counterclaimed for breach of contract. After a bench trial, the court 
dismissed the winery's complaint and awarded damages on the bottler's counter-
claim, including an amount for loss of goodwill. The case was affirmed on 
appeal. The Supreme J udical Court stated that lost goodwill was a recoverable 
item of consequential damages under U.C.C. section 2-715 and concluded that 
the Joss had been proved with sufficient specificity. 
Damages for lost goodwill were denied by a bankruptcy court in In re 
Lifeguard Industries, lnc. 166 There a manufacturer sold defective aluminum 
siding to an installer. Later the manufacturer went bankrupt and a turnover 
complaint was filed against the installer for money owed the manufacturer. The 
installer counterclaimed for breach of warranty, seeking as an item of damage 
an amount for lost customer goodwill. The court concluded that the claim of lost 
goodwill had not been sufficiently proved and in any event was not a recoverable 
item even if proved. 
Reynolds Metals Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 167 involved the measure 
of damages for the defective installation of a large electric transformer. The 
transformer was sold and delivered to buyer, who stored it for almost two years. 
Buyer then installed the transformer. Seller's engineer then inspected the 
transformer and supervised its start-up. Apparently at this time the engineer did 
not properly install a system for detecting internal problems in the transformer. 
Less than a year after installation the transformer failed. Buyer paid the seller 
$109,000 to repair it. About two years later buyer sued seller based upon the 
failure of the transformer. Buyer's claims in negligence, strict liability, and 
breach of warranty as to the goods were all dismissed because the applicable 
statutes of limitation had expired. Buyer's claim of breach of warranty as to the 
services was also dismissed based on what the court found to be an effective 
warranty disclaimer. That left only buyer's breach of contract claim as to the 
services, which the trial court left to the jury. The jury found for the buyer on 
that claim and the court awarded as damages the buyer's cost of repair. 
163. See generally Simon & Novack, Limiting the Buyer's Market Damages to Lost Profits: A 
Challenge to the Enforceability of Market Contracts, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1395 ( 1979). 
164. See 4 R. Anderson Uniform Commercial Code§ 2-715:42 (3d ed. 1983). 
165. 393 Mass. 666, 473 N.E.2d 1066, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 93 (1985). 
166. 42 Bankr. 734, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1268 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983). 
167. 758 F.2d 1073, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1702 (5th Cir. 1985). 
1390 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 41, August 1986 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the liability theory 
but reversed on the measure of damages. In affirming the liability theory 
submitted to the jury, the court distinguished between an improper performance 
of service obligations and a complete failure to perform any service obligations. 
The former, the court said, was covered by the services warranty disclaimer; the 
latter was not. 168 On the measure of damages issue, the court concluded that cost 
of repair was not a proper measure of damage here. First, there was a causation 
problem. Buyer's own evidence showed that a portion of the transformer 
damage was caused by a design defect for which seller was no longer liable. 169 
Second, even without the causation problem, the court found that the proper 
measure of damage was not cost of repair to restore the failed transformer to 
working condition but only what it would have cost to have had the services in 
question performed properly in the first place. The court concluded this first by 
applying U.C.C. section 2-714 by analogy (because the breach involved services 
not goods). It then found the cost of restoring the transformer to be an 
unrecoverable consequential damage because of a clause in the contract exclud-
ing liability for consequential damages, rather than the measure of damage 
under that subsection. 
ST A TUT ES OF LIMITATIONS 
The statute of limitations begins to run for most breach of warranty claims 
when tender of delivery is made; however, if the warranty "explicitly extends to 
future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time 
of such performance," the statute of limitations begins to run only "when the 
breach is or should have been discovered."170 The distinction between ordinary 
warranties and "future performance" warranties has produced much litigation. 
This year has been no different. A sampling of the more interesting cases 
follows. 
In Allis-Chalmers Credit Corp. v. Herbolt, 111 an Ohio Appeals Court decided 
inter alia that the usual "repair or replace" limitation of remedy clause was not 
a future performance warranty. 172 The case involved a breach of warranty claim 
by a farmer against a combine manufacturer, apparently to recover for economic 
loss, not personal injuries or property damage. 
168. Seller argued that the contract term mandating seller's inspection and start-up services had 
been included for the seller's benefit so that it was seller's "right," not an "obligation." The court 
commented favorably upon this argument. Ultimately the court did not entertain the argument, 
because it had not been raised at trial. Id. at 1078, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1710-11. 
169. Id. at 1077 n.6, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1709 n.6. 
170. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1978); see also U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1978). 
171. 17 Ohio App. 3d 230, 479 N.E.2d 293, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 485 (1984). 
172. The cases are not in agreement on this point. For a collection of some of the conflicting 
cases see 5 R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code§ 2-725:95 (3d ed. 1983 and Supp. 1985). 
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In Economy Housing Co. v. Continental Forest Products, lnc., 113 the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals applied a Nebraska Supreme Court decision174 that 
held that the description of goods as "siding" created a warranty that extended 
explicitly to future performance. In reversing summary judgment for the seller, 
the Eighth Circuit ruled that in light of the buyer's description of the goods in 
its complaint, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 
limitations period had run. 
The statute of limitations for wari:anty actions other than future performance 
warranty actions begins to run "when tender of delivery is made." 176 When a 
consumer sues a remote seller such as a distributor the question arises whether 
the statute begins to run upon the distributor's tender of delivery to its buyer or 
upon the tender of delivery to the consumer. In Heller v. United States Suzuki 
Motor Corp., 176 the New York State Court of Appeals held that the statute 
begins upon the distributor's tender of delivery to its buyer. In that case, the 
consumer sued in warranty177 a distributor and the retailer three years and 
seven months after the consumer was injured in a motorcycle accident. The 
consumer had purchased the motorcycle from the retailer three years and ten 
months prior to the suit. The distributor had tendered delivery to its immediate 
purchaser four years and ten months before suit. 178 The distributor asserted the 
statute of limitations as a defense. It moved for summary judgment arguing that 
the relevant tender of delivery was its tender to its immediate purchaser, and 
Special Term denied the motion and dismissed the distributor's statute of 
limitations defense. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the con-
sumer's claim against the distributor. 
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed179 the order of the Appellate 
Division. The court held the relevant tender under U.C.C. section 2-725(2) to 
be the distributor's tender to its immediate purchaser. Thus, the consumer's 
claim against the distributor was time-barred. 180 
In Dowling v. Southwestern Porcelain, lnc.,'81 the Kansas Supreme Court 
held that the statute of limitations began to run only upon installation of a silo, 
not upon delivery of its component parts to the buyer. 182 There the buyer 
173. 757 F.2d 200, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 823 (8th Cir. 1985). 
174. Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 214 Neb. 14, 332 N.W.2d 212, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 82 ( 1983 ). 
175. u.c.c. § 2-725(2) (1978). 
176. 64 N.Y.2d 407, 477 N.E.2d 434, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 917 (1985). 
177. The consumer's tort claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Id. at 409, 
477 N.E. 2d at 435, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 917. 
178. This distributor tendered delivery to another distributor who in turn sold the motorcycle to 
the retailer. Id. at 409-10, 477 N.E.2d at 435, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 918. 
179. Two judges dissented. 
180. For cases holding that the statute does not begin to run until tender of delivery to the 
consumer, see Judge Meyer's dissent. 64 N.Y.2d at 417, 477 N.E.2d at 440, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) at 925. 
181. 237 Kan. 536, 701P.2d954, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 127 (1985). 
182. The case law apparently is not in accord on this point. See the cases discussed in the 
principal case. 
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purchased a high-moisture grain silo from a dealer who was also to install it. 
The manufacturer shipped the silo directly to the buyer. Two months later the 
dealer completed installation. Subsequently the dealer went bankrupt and was 
dissolved. The silo leaked, so the manufacturer had another of its dealers 
attempt to repair the leaks, apparently unsuccessfully. Buyer sued the manufac-
turer on a variety of theories, including breach of warranty. Suit was filed 
within four years of the silo's installation but not within four years of its 
delivery. The trial court granted summary judgment for the manufacturer upon 
the grounds that the installing dealer was not an agent of the manufacturer and 
that the statute of limitations had expired. 
On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case. It 
concluded that the buyer's warranty suit had been timely filed, because U.C.C. 
section 2-725(1) had begun to run only upon the installation of silo. The court 
gave essentially three reasons for its decision. First, the buyer had contracted for 
an installed silo. Second, the manufacturer had an interest in the quality and 
control of the installation.183 Third, the buyer could not test the silo to determine 
whether it was acceptable until after installation. 
Buyers often argue that unsuccessful repair attempts extend the time within 
which the buyers must sue. 184 Their arguments have been about as successful as 
their seller's repair attempts. Of five such cases, only one permitted the buyer to 
recover. 
In Ranker v. Skyline Corp., 185 the Pennsylvania Superior Court did not 
permit recovery. The buyer had purchased a travel trailer that leaked. Seller 
made several good faith attempts at repair over a two- to three-year period. 
Buyer filed suit against the manufacturer four years and one month after he had 
taken initial delivery of the trailer. The manufacturer demurred asserting the 
statute of limitations. The trial court accepted the demurrer and dismissed 
buyer's complaint. On appeal the superior court affirmed. First, the court stated 
that the manufacturer's standard repair warranty did not constitute a future 
performance warranty. Next, it held that even if the repair warranty had been a 
future performance warranty, dismissal was proper because the buyer had not 
sued until more than four years after he had discovered the defect. Finally, the 
court held that the manufacturer's unsuccessful attempts at repair did not estop 
it from asserting the statute of limitations. Two elements were necessary for 
estoppel, said the court: attempts at repair and a representation that the repairs 
would correct the defect. The buyer failed to aver that the manufacturer had 
183. The manufacturer's interest in the quality and control of the installation was evidenced by 
several facts: the installing dealer was commencing business in territory in which a competitor was 
already entrenched. The dealership agreement had provided for the purchase by the dealer of 
expensive erection equipment from the manufacturer and for training of the dealer's erection and 
service people by the manufacturer. 237 Kan. at 543-44, 701 P.2d at 960, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) at 132. 
184. See generally, Kanovitz, The Seller Fiddles and the Clock Ticks: Seller's Cure and the 
U.C.C. Statute of Limitations, 60 Notre Dame L. Rev. 318 (1985). 
185. 342 Pa. Super. 510, 493 A.2d 706, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 476 (1985). 
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made any such representation. Thus the complaint was defective and properly 
dismissed. 
In Laurita v. International Harvester, 186 the only case to permit the buyer to 
avoid the statute of limitations, a Pennsylvania Common Pleas court found both 
elements of estoppel to be alleged. Thus the court denied the manufacturer's 
motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
In New England Power Co. v. Riley Stoker Corp., 181 the manufacturer 
designed, built, and installed two sophisticated boilers for buyer. The boilers did 
not function properly. Eventually after several years of repeated repair at-
tempts, the manufacturer ceased to make attempts to repair. Two years after 
this, and at least five years after delivery of the last boiler, the buyer sued the 
manufacturer for inter alia breach of warranty. The manufacturer asserted the 
statute of limitations and moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted 
that motion. On appeal, the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed. It held, as 
had the Ranker court, that the manufacturer's repair warranty did not extend 
the time within which the buyer had to sue. On the estoppel issue, the court 
characterized the manufacturer's efforts to repair as nothing more than "honest, 
genuine repair efforts" and as such insufficient to work an estoppel. 
In Nelligan v. Tom Chaney Motors, /nc.,'88 the consumer buyer of a defective 
automobile argued that the seller's conduct in attempting to repair was a 
warranty explicitly extending to future performance. Her warranty claims were 
dismissed as time-barred. On appeal, an Illinois appellate court affirmed. It 
stated that the repair conduct could, at best, give rise only to an implied, not an 
explicit warranty. 
In Peerless Pump v. Blythe-Vanguard Construction Corp., 189 the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York held a buyer's warranty 
counterclaim to be time-barred under New York law. The case involved the 
manufacture of effluent pumps to buyer's specifications. The court held the 
contract to be one for goods, not services, so that the U.C.C. four-year, not the 
general contract six-year, statute of limitations applied. It further held the 
contract to be for delivery only, not installation, so that buyer's claim accrued 
upon delivery. In passing, the court noted that attempts to repair did not, as a 
matter of Jaw, toll the statute of limitations. 
BULK SALES 
Article 6 of the U.C.C. has not produced much litigation in the period under 
review. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals in San Antonio was, however, faced 
with deciding Texas's stand on the issue of what constitutes the "concealment" 
that would toll the six-month statute of limitations in U.C.C. section 6-111 until 
186. 32 Pa. D. & C. 3d 563, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 133 (Pa. Court Common Pleas, 
Fayette Co. 1983 ). 
187. 20 Mass. App. Ct. 25, 477 N.E.2d 1054, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1735 (1985). 
188. 133 Ill. App. 3d 798, 479 N.E.2d 439, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 480 (1985). 
189. 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
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the discovery of the transfer. 190 One set of authorities has held that affirmative 
efforts to conceal the transfer must be shown.191 The contrary rulings find 
concealment in a complete failure to comply with the notice provisions of article 
6. 192 In the Texas case, the record showed three occasions within a month of the 
transfer on which the party claiming "concealment" had dealt with the trans-
feree, and on one occasion its employee had been requested to change an invoice 
to reflect the transferee as the purchaser. 193 The court rejected "the notion that 
mere failure to give the written notice required by the Act [article 6] amounts to 
concealment as a matter of law." The court held "that concealment as contem-
plated by § 6-111 occurs when the record discloses affirmative efforts at conceal-
ing the transaction and when there has been complete and total failure to 
comply with the notice provisions of the statute."194 
The timing here is close. Exact dates are not given in the opinion, the court 
merely stating that suit was filed when "almost seven months had elapsed from 
the date of the transfer."195 Hence the court, in referring to posttransfer 
transactions, must have treated them as indicating no affirmative effort to 
conceal. 
The committee to propose a redraft of article 6 to the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws196 has been meeting. While no decisions 
have been made, discussions indicate some desire on the part of some members 
to expand the coverage to include voluntary liquidations, and to impose some 
duties on auctioneers who conduct bulk sales. There is also discussion of 
exempting small transactions. Instead of limiting coverage to enterprises selling 
goods from stock, there is discussion of defining a bulk sale in terms of a sale of 
moveable assets of the transferor. Moveable assets would by definition include 
190. SVM Invs. v. Mexican Exporters, Inc., 685 S.W.2d 424, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 1017 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). 
191. The court cited Aluminum Shapes, Inc. v. K-A Liquidating Co., 290 F. Supp. 356, 5 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1194 (W.D. Pa. 1968); Chas. Adler & Son, Inc. v. DiNunzio, 5 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 743 (Pa. Court Common Pleas 1967); Areolineas Argentinas v. 
Hansen & Yorke Co., Inc., 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 329 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1973) 
(dictum); cf Lang v. Graham (Jn re Borba), 736 F.2d 1317, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
1714 (9th Cir. 1984); Chartered Bank of London v. Diamant (Jn re Del Norte Depot, Inc.), 716 
F.2d 557, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1415 (9th Cir. 1983). Also cited was 2 W. Hawkland, 
A Transactional Guide to the Uniform Commercial Code§ 3.03 at 846 (1964). 
192. Cited were E. J. Trum, Inc. v. Blanchard Parfums, Inc., 33 A.D.2d 689, 306 N.Y.S.2d 
316, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1261 (1969); see also McKissick v. Foremost-McKesson, 
Inc., 441 F.2d 811, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 301 (5th Cir. 1971) (dictum); Columbian 
Rope Co. v. Rinek Cordage Co., 314 Pa. Super. 585, 461 A.2d 312, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 922 (1983). As supporting this result, the court referred to 3A R. Dusenberg & L. 
King, Sales and Bulk Transfers Under the Uniform Commercial Code§ 15.07 (1984); J. White & 
R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code§ 19-3 (2d ed. 1980). 
193. SVM Investments v. Mexican Importers, 685 S.W.2d at 429, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) at 1021. 
194. Id. at 428, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1021. 
195. Id., 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1019. 
196. Following its usual procedure, the National Conference has appointed Chancellor William 
Hawkland as reporter, a committee of commissioners, and a group of advisers. 
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such things as customer lists, accounts, and the like. Thus, if these views prevail, 
all sales of any business would be included, unless coming within one of several 
exemptions. 197 
DOCUMENTS OF TITLE 
The cases under article 7, only occasionally discussed in this survey, did cover 
five areas worth mentioning briefly. 
Two cases discussed whether, in interstate shipments, the U.C.C. supplied a 
source for federal law. 198 Judge Haight in the Southern District of New York 
held that the Carmack Amendment199 to the LC.A. Act applied to freight 
forwarders and required dismissal of claims against a carrier for negligent 
actions. All such must be in contract and hence subject to tariff limitations 
unless the shipper can identify a general duty not dependent on the contract, 
and a breach thereof. The Eighth Circuit200 held that the recent deregulation of 
air carriers did not make the U.C.C. a source of federal law for interstate 
shipments in which well-developed pre-U.C.C. federal law provided a rule for 
decision. Hence an exclusion of liability in a shipper's contract with Federal 
Express did not enure to the benefit of Great Western Air Lines, an agent 
carrier. For this to happen pre-U.C.C. federal law required that the agent 
carrier be expressly made a beneficiary of that contract or be a party to it. 201 
Shortened contractual times for filing claims and instituting legal action were 
involved in three cases. Unlike the rule in New York that an action for 
conversion is not subject to contractual time bars,202 the cases in the Fourth 
Circuit applying Maryland law,203 Seventh Circuit under Illinois law,20• and in 
the New Jersey Court of Appeals205 held that, although conversion was ex-
197. In addition to the exemption of small transactions under consideration, attention is being 
given to transactions in which a solvent buyer assumes all debts of which the buyer has notice. 
Various measures are being discussed to protect those whose debts are not assumed by the buyer. 
198. Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Great W. Airlines, Inc., 767 F.2d 425, 41 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 962 (8th Cir. 1985) and Starmakers Publishing Corp. v. Acme Fast 
Freight, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 787, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
199. 49U.S.C.§11707, amending the Interstate Commerce Act, 49U.S.C.§§10101-11917 
(1982). 
200. Arkwright, 767 F.2d at 425, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 962. 
201. Id. at 427, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 965, citing Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Mach. 
Co., 359 U.S. 297, 303, 305 (1959). 
202. I.C.C. Metals Inc. v. Municipal Warehouse Co., 50 N.Y.2d 657, 409 N.E.2d 849, 431 
N.Y.S.2d 372, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 217 (1980). 
203. Phillips Bros. v. Locust Indus., Inc., 760 F.2d 523, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 606 
(4th Cir. 1985 ). 
204. Refrigerator Sales Co., Inc. v. Mitchell-Jackson, Inc., 770 F.2d 98, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 955 (7th Cir. 1985). 
205. Amenip Corp. v. Ultimate Distrib. Sys., Inc., 200 N.J. Super. 100, 490 A.2d 371, 40 
V.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1367 (1985). Applying New Jersey law, the Second Circuit, in 
Natural Resources Trading, Inc. v. Trans Freight Lines, 766 F.2d 65, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 948 (2d Cir. 1985), ruled that New Jersey law created a presumption of conversion, 
but U.C.C. § 7-204(3) (1978) was not involved. 
1396 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 41, August 1986 
eluded from damage limitation under U.C.C. section 7-204(2),206 no such 
exclusion was specified in U.C.C. section 7-204(3) on shortening the time for 
suit. The holdings were that actions for damage or nondelivery were necessarily 
based on the bailment.207 
While U.C.C. section 7-204(2) permits limitation of liability for negligence 
unless a higher fee is paid for greater declared value, in Allstate Insurance Co. v. 
Winnebago County Fair Ass'n, Inc. 208 the court first held a county fair to be a 
warehouse as to equipment stored. In the holding, combining U.C.C. section 1-
102(3) with U.C.C. section 7-204(2), the ruling was that liability for negligence 
could not be totally disclaimed as the court below had ruled. Since there was no 
stated monetary limit, would full negligence damages be recoverable on de-
mand? For monetary limits, will courts develop some theory requiring a "fair 
quantum" of damages? 209 
When there is an unexplained disappearance from the warehouse, and hence 
a failure to deliver, Judge Posner, in Refrigeration Sales Co. v. Mitchell-
Jackson, Inc.,2 10 noted a difference in the resulting presumption. Some courts, 
led by New York, presume conversion211 and thus eliminate limitations of 
liability due to the more culpable nature of that tort. Others, presuming 
negligence,212 then permit limitation of liability. 
It is not clear whether the distinction has any effect on the evidence necessary 
to overcome the presumption. Judge Posner's Seventh Circuit panel apparently 
opted for negligence but stated that even if the presumption were conversion, the 
warehouseman's evidence was enough to rebut the presumption. Since the lower 
court granted summary judgment because the action was time-barred by the 
clause just discussed, it is difficult to see why the rebutting of the presumption 
206. U.C.C. § 7-204(2) (1978) excludes from the clause permitting warehouseman to limit 
damages only when a warehouse converts to its own use. In the examples of conversion in Judge 
Posner's opinion in Refrigerator Sales Co., Inc., 770 F.2d at 98, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 955, the 
learned judge, although he does not say so, appears to emphasize the "to his own use." Hence he 
would only presume negligence in the event of an unexplained failure to deliver. 
207. The limiting words in U.C.C. § 7-204(3) (1978) on shortening the time for bringing 
actions require that the actions be "based on the bailment." In l.C.C. Metals, Inc., 50 N.Y.2d at 
657, 409 N.E.2d at 849, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 372, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 217, the New 
York court felt that a conversion to one's own .use destroyed the bailment and the action was based 
on the tort. 
208. 131 Ill. App. 3d 225, 475 N.E.2d 230, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1361 (1985). 
209. See U.C.C. § 2-719, Comment 1 (1978). 
210. See 50 N.Y.2d at 657, 409 N.E.2d at 849, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 372, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) at 217. 
211. Citing l.C.C. Metals, Inc. v. Municipal Warehouse Co., id. Joseph H. Reinfeld, Inc. v. 
Griswold & Bateman Warehouse, Inc., 189 N.J. Super. 141, 458 A.2d 1341, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 262 (1983) and National Resources Trading, Inc. v. Trans Freight Lines, 766 F.2d at 
65, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 948. 
212. Lerner v. Brettschneider, 123 Ariz. 152, 598 P.2d 515 (Ct. App. 1979); Sanfisket, Inc. v. 
Atlantic Cold Storage Corp., 347 So. 2d 647, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1155 (Fla. App. 
1977); Adams v. Ryan & Christie Storage, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 409, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 930 (E.D. Pa. 1982) ajfd mem., 725 F.2d 666 (3d Cir. 1983). See also Frissell v. John 
W. Rogers, Inc., 141 Conn. 308, 106 A.2d 162 (1954). 
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was discussed. As summarized by Judge Posner as "barely enough in the case of 
the missing goods," that evidence was "an explanation, not implausible in the 
circumstances-a large warehouse, a reputable owner, some goods returned 
damaged, a long course of dealing between the parties."213 
Elsewhere it appears that the employee in charge stated that "he thought ... 
[that the missing containers] had been returned ... as empties" to the deposi-
tor.214 
Far more stringent is the Connecticut rule for rebutting the presumption of 
negligence as applied by New York's Appellate Division, First Department,210 
holding that Connecticut law required the warehouseman to prove something 
more than circumstances indicating the immediate cause of the damage. "The 
proof must go so far as to establish what, if any, human conduct materially 
contributed to that immediate cause."216 Thus plaintiff, the assignee of the 
depositor, won a summary judgment on liability. 
Each of the last two cases has one other facet. The Seventh Circuit panel 
ruled that the time-bar clause in the warehouse receipt also protected the 
warehouseman's employee in charge from individual liability.217 
In the New York case, the matter was remanded so "that plaintiff should be 
given an opportunity to present additional facts, if there should be any, that 
would raise a factual issue as to whether there was a legally binding contractual 
agreement limiting liability."218 This despite a signed warehouse receipt for art 
objects containing a clause limiting liability to thirty cents per pound. 
The Innocent Agent rule of U.C.C. section 7-404, in United States v. New 
Holland Sales Stable, Inc., 219 even if applicable, would not have protected 
commission merchants from liability to FmHA, a secured party, as they had not 
observed reasonable commercial standards in that they "never conducted a lien 
search or even contacted the County Supervisor Freeman to determine the status 
of the cattle sold despite the fact that the Nolls' [the actual sellers] name was on 
a list circulated by the FmHA". 220 "Commercial standards" apparently equal 
213. 770 F.2d at 102, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 960. 
214. Id. at 100, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 956. 
215. Hacohen v. Bolliger, Ltd., 108 A.D.2d 357, 489 N.Y.S.2d 75, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 1404 (1st Dept. 1985 ). 
216. Id. 108 A.D.2d at 361, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 78, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1406, 
citing Griffin v. Nationwide Moving & Storage Co., 187 Conn. 405, 446 A.2d 799, 802, 34 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 970 (1982). 
217. See Refrigeration Sales Co., Inc., 770 F.2d at 103, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 
961. The rationale was, 
The bailee would indemnify its employee for any judgment paid in such a suit, or if not would 
have to pay the employee a higher wage to compensate him for bearing the risk of such a suit 
and either way the burden of the suit would come to rest on the bailee despite the limitation 
clause. 
The reasoning is that of "law and economics" and not very realistic. 
218. 108 A.D.2d at 362, 489 N.Y. Supp. 2d at 79, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 1407. 
219. 603 F. Supp. 1379, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 715 (E.D. Pa. 1985). 
220. Id. at 1387, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 725. 
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the conduct expected of a lawyer giving an opinion. Is U.C.C. section 7-404 to 
have the fate of U.C.C. section 3-419(3)? 
The New York Truth in Storage Act,221 awarding successful plaintiffs treble 
damages and recovery of attorneys' fees, applies only to unlawful detention and 
not to loss by negligence, according to the New York City court.222 
221. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law§ 605-610 (McKinney 1984). 
222. Copeland v. Schwartz Moving & Storage Corp., 483 N.Y.S.2d 945, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 605 (1985). 
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